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state. 1 Appealing to principles that underlie the Eleventh Amendment,
the Court has held that citizens cannot sue their own state in federal
court;2 states are immune from private damages actions in their own
courts;3  and Congress's Article I powers cannot abrogate these
immunities.
4
As the careful reader will have noted, all of the immunities listed
above involve suits by private plaintiffs. 5 This is no accident: the Court has
also held that states are not immune from lawsuits brought by the United
States.6 Thus, while private plaintiffs may not sue states for violating such
federal laws as the minimum wage requirement,7 the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act,8 or the Americans with Disabilities Act, 9 the United
States may do so.
The distinction between private plaintiffs and the United States
raises an important state immunity issue regarding so-called qui tam
actions.10 In a qui tam action, a private actor, known as the relator, brings
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any
Foreign State.").
2 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890).
3 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999).
4 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996). At this time,
Congress can use its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state
immunity. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.").
5 Further, the immunity applies only to suits for retrospective money damages,
as the Court has held that states do not have immunity from prospective orders aimed
at state officials. SeeExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908); see also 1 LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-27, at 556 (3d ed. 2000) (The Eleventh
Amendment "does not ordinarily prevent federal courts, even in the absence of
express congressional authorization, from requiring states, through their officers, to
comply with prospective federal injunctions.").
6 See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892). Similarly, states are not
immune from suit in federal court by other states. See South Dakota v. North Carolina,
192 U.S. 286, 318 (1904). States' immunity, however, does extend to suits by
sovereigns other than the United States or one of the states, such as foreign nations
and Indian tribes. See Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991)
(holding that states are immune from federal court suits by Indian tribes); Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934) (holding that states are immune from federal
court suits by foreign sovereigns).
7 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 754.
8 See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000).
9 See Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, No. 99-1240, slip op. at 1-2 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2001).
10 The phrase qui tam is derived from the Latin phrase "qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequiter," which means "who pursues this action on our
Lord the King's behalf as well as his own." SeeVt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States
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suit against a person who allegedly violated federal law.11 The relator
brings suit on behalf of the United States to recover a fine, penalty, or
damages owed to the United States.12 Typically, the relator receives a
percentage of any money recovered for the United States, with the
remaining money going to the federal treasury.' 3 Qui tam actions exist
only for those federal statutes where Congress has specifically authorized
the practice. 14 When Congress does so, it effectively invites private
citizens to take part in public law enforcement.
The immunity question is whether the private relator or the United
States should be deemed the plaintiff in a qui tam action against a state.
If the relator is deemed the plaintiff, the state is immune from suit by that
private party.15 If the United States is deemed the plaintiff, the state is
not immune from a suit by the United States.16 Over the last decade,
academic commentators, judges, and litigants have spilled much ink on
this issue, reaching differing conclusions.' 7 Their works focus on the
typical modalities of constitutional argument, mining the Constitution's
text, history, structure, and the like. In short, these writers ask as an
original matter what the Constitution says about state immunity from qui
ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLAccsroNE,
CoMMENrAms *160).
11 See id. at 769.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 767-70.
14 See id. at 768 n.1.
15 See United States ex rel Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 294 (5th Cir.
1999).
16 See id.
17 On case law, compare id. at 294 (holding state immunity barred qui tam suit),
with United States ex rel Stevens v. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res., 162 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding state immunity did not bar qui tam suit), rev'd on other grounds, 529
U.S. 765 (2000), United States ex ret Rodgers v. Arkansas, 154 F.3d 865, 868 (8th Cir.
1998) (same), United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs., 104 F.3d 1453, 1458 (4th Cir.
1997) (same), and United States ex rel. Fine v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 39 F.3d 957, 963
(9th Cir. 1994) (same), vacated on other grounds, 72 F.3d 740 (9th Cir. 1995). On
commentary, compare James T. Blanch, The Constitutionality of the False Claims Act's
Qui Tam Provision, 16 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 701, 703 (1993) (concluding that qui
tam actions are probably not constitutional), with Evan H. Caminker, State Immunity
Waivers for Suits by the United States, 98 MIcH. L. REv. 92, 95 (1999) (defining proper
scope of qui tam actions that may overcome state immunity), and Jonathan R. Siegel,
The Hidden Source of Congress's Power, to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEx. L. REv.
539, 541-42 (1995) (defending the view that qui tam actions overcome state
immunity). The Supreme Court has received extensive briefing on the question,
though it disposed of the case on another ground. See Stevens, 529 U.S. at 787
(holding that states are not a "person" within the meaning of the Federal False Claims
Act and, thus, cannot be sued under that statute).
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tam actions. One more article along those lines would add little, if
anything, to the debate.
This Article takes a different tack. Instead of reviewing the question
anew, we focus on provocative dicta in a recent Supreme Court case-
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak' 8-that bears on the question. After
all, from a realist perspective, even dicta reveals something about the
Court's thinking on the issue, especially given that five members of the
Blatchford majority remain on the Court.19 Any litigant or lower court
would be remiss to dismiss such language, and the Court itself will likely
consider, if not adopt, the position there stated.
Before describing our project, some quick background about
Blatchford would be informative. The case involved a federal court suit
brought by an Indian village against a state. 20 The village argued that the
state was not immune: because the United States could sue states to
vindicate Native American rights, the United States could statutorily
delegate that authority to the village.21 As a matter of statutory
interpretation, the Court held that Congress had never purported to
delegate its power to sue states to the Indian tribes.22 Then, purely
beside the point, the Court stated that the Constitution prohibits the
United States from simply delegating its power to sue the states. 23 The
Court did not explain either what this dicta meant or how it might apply
in other contexts.
The Blatchford dicta raises an important question about qui tam
actions: Are such actions best characterized as a simple delegation of the
United States's power to sue the states,24 or is there some other way to
characterize qui tam actions that saves them from Blatchfords non-
delegation rule? An answer lies in the Blatchford dicta's central concern:
allowing the United States unlimited authority to delegate its law
18 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
19 The Court decided Blatchford by a 6-3 vote. Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Antonin Scalia, Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter
formed the Blatchford majority. See id. at 776. The sixth member of the majority,
Justice Byron White, has since retired and been replaced by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.
20 Id. at 778.
21 Id. at 783.
22 Id. at 785-86.
23 See id. at 785 ("We doubt.., that that sovereign exemption [to be sued by the
United States] can be delegated-even if one limits the permissibility of delegation
(as respondents propose) to persons on whose behalf the United States itself might
sue.").
24 The Fifth Circuit accepted this characterization of the qui tam statute in
holding that states were immune from qui tam actions in federal courts. See United
States ex rel. Foulds v. Tex. Tech Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 294 (5th Cir. 1999).
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enforcement power would effectively destroy the state immunities
described above.25 Congress could simply couch any new federal
statutory private right of action as a delegation of the United States's
power to police and punish the underlying conduct.
. Consider an example of how Congress could recast a private lawsuit
as a qui tam action. Assume that Congress enacts a new federal minimum
wage statute. Instead of giving individual employees a private right to sue
for violations, Congress makes any violation of the statute a federal
offense subject to civil enforcement by the United States; each violation is
subject to a penalty of $1,000 plus the amount of wages wrongfully
withheld. Then, Congress delegates the United States's enforcement
power, via a qui tam action, to all persons aggrieved by an employer's
violation of the statute. As a qui tam relator, the aggrieved person would
sue on behalf of the United States to recover the civil penalty from the
employer. As an "incentive" to bring suit, the statute awards the qui tam
relator a portion of the United States's recovery, say ninety-nine percent,
with the remainder going to the United States Treasury. While the form
may differ from a simple private right of action, the substance does not.
State immunity would be at an end.
Not all delegations of federal law enforcement power are intended
to circumvent state immunity. For example, consider historical use of the
qui tam action. As discussed below, 26 the First Congress employed qui tam
actions to supplement the then-scarce resources of public law
enforcement. Later, qui tam actions proved useful in detecting and
punishing hard-to-discover crimes such as fraud against the government.
In both cases, the qui tam action served a real, proven law enforcement
need, and was not a simple trick to avoid state immunity.
27
25 See Caminker, supra note 17, at 134.
Where the "real party in interest" is private rather that the United States
itself, qui tam authorization feels like something of a bootstrap; one might
suspiciously view it as an effort to circumvent the Seminole Tribe/Alden rule
that Congress cannot authorize private parties to assert their "own" interests
against states.
Id.; see also Scott P. Glauberman, Citizen Suits Against States: The Exclusive Jurisdiction
Dilemma, 45 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S. 63, 103 (1997) (describing a qui tam action as
"little more than an end run around the Eleventh Amendment"); Henry Paul
Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception", 110 HAv. L. REv. 102, 126 (1996) (ex-
pressing concern that the Supreme Court will see qui tam actions as an attempt to
circumvent state immunity).
26 See infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
27; Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the qui tam action authorized by the
Federal False Claims Act-the most used qui tam action in current practice-by its
terms does not apply to the states. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel.
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So, Blatchford's concern with easily circumventing state immunity
does not apply to all delegations of federal law enforcement power. The
next question is whether we can reliably distinguish delegations intended
to circumvent state immunity from delegations enacted for other reasons.
Can we construct a coherent doctrine or test that judges can use to
distinguish good and bad delegations? If not, each delegation of federal
law enforcement power is suspect, and we have no way to tell when
Congress is trying to circumvent the states' constitutional protection.
The only way to save state immunity would be to forbid all such
delegations.
Blatchford's challenge, then, is one of doctrine building: Can we
construct a legal doctrine or test to distinguish delegations intended to
circumvent state immunity from delegations enacted for other reasons? 28
To answer this challenge, we turn to two insights from law and
economics: Ronald Coase's theory of the firm and the antitrust doctrine
of ancillary restraints on trade. First, we consider Coase's classic essay The
Nature of the Firm.29 In that work, Coase explains why people form firms,
such as partnerships, corporations, or other similar entities, rather than
carrying on business on their own.30 For example, why do some lawyers
practice together in a firm, while others fly solo? And, when lawyers do
form a firm, why do they hire employees to perform some work, such as
secretarial tasks, but contract with outsiders to perform other work, such
as copying or messenger services? Coase argues that the relative costs of
the various options-law firm versus solo practice, hiring secretaries
versus contracting out for secretarial services-determine the ultimate
decisions.
3 '
Using Coase's theory of the firm, we argue that a federal scheme that
delegates a law enforcement role to private actors, such as the qui tam
action, allows Congress to intelligently structure federal law enforcement
in a way that makes the best economic sense. Like the private firm,
government can weigh the relative costs of different institutional
arrangements and minimize those costs. When Congress does so, it is not
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 788 (2000). Thus, one could not plausibly describe that statute
as an attempt to circumvent state immunity.
28 As Professor Richard Fallon has demonstrated, much of constitutional law
focuses on translating general principles and policies into a workable judicial
doctrine. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARv. L. REv. 56 (1997) (explaining how the
Supreme Court crafts constitutional doctrine and arguing that Justices must
sometimes set aside their own personal views on constitutional implementation).
29 See R.H. COASE, The Nature of the Firm, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW
33 (1988).
30 See id. at 37-51.
31 Id. at 40.
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simply circumventing state immunity, but rather acting for another
legitimate purpose. Such delegations should overcome state immunity.
We next turn to the antitrust doctrine of ancillary restraints to
translate Coase's theory of the firm into a judicial doctrine. As noted
above, once we determine that some delegations of federal law
enforcement should be allowed, we need a doctrine or test to distinguish
permissible delegations from impermissible ones. Specifically, we need a
way for judges to distinguish delegations made to circumvent state
immunity from delegations made to implement a Coasean allocation of
enforcement resources. The doctrine of ancillary restraints provides a
model for just such a doctrine.
The antitrust doctrine of ancillary restraints arises from the
fundamental recognition that some restraints of trade are necessary to a
working economy.32 For example, every contract restrains trade in some
small way, as do associations such as partnerships. In a contract or a
partnership, people agree to work together to create greater value for
society. Implicit in each such agreement is the foregone opportunity to
work with others. Thus, each contract and partnership restrains trade by
foreclosing other possible contracts or partnerships.
Antitrust law cannot forbid all restraints of trade; to do so would
effectively destroy the economy. Rather, antitrust law needs some way to
distinguish the bad (and thus unlawful) restraints on trade from the good
ones. Here arose the doctrine of ancillary restraints. A restraint of trade
would be lawful if it was ancillary to an economic arrangement that
provided value to society.33 The word "ancillary" basically means that the
restraint of trade is necessary to the success of the larger economic
venture. For example, a partnership is economically beneficial because it
allows different people with different skills and resources to pool
together in a common, ongoing enterprise without the need to
continuously contract with one another on the open market. To make
the partnership work, however, the partners bind one another to work
for the benefit of the partnership and forego other opportunities. The
restraint is necessary to the partnership's success, making the restraint
ancillary. The ancillary restraint doctrine, then, asks what the function or
object of the restraint on trade is. If the object of the restraint is to
enable a larger economic transaction, the restraint is valid. If the object
32 See Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding
that a "war of all against all is not a good model for any economy").
33 As noted below, this is an oversimplification of how the ancillary restraint
doctrine actually works in antitrust law. See infra notes 114-33 and accompanying
text. Because we are interested in the ancillary restraint doctrine only as a model of a
type of analysis, and not in the antitrust implications of the doctrine,
oversimplification does not rob the discussion of relevant substance.
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of the restraint is merely to hamper competition, the restraint is not
ancillary and, thus, is not valid.
The ancillary restraint doctrine provides a model for implementing
the Coasean approach to delegations of federal law enforcement power.
As noted above,34 Congress and the Executive have determined that qui
tam actions against states are the best enforcement mechanism for certain
types of matters. In those situations, delegation of the United States's
power to sue states would be ancillary to the larger attempt to efficiently
structure federal law enforcement. When the delegation is ancillary, it
should be upheld. If the delegation is not ancillary, it should be treated
as a naked attempt to circumvent the Eleventh Amendment and struck
down.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews Coase's theory of
the firm and its application to government institutions. Part II uses the
antitrust doctrine of ancillary restraints to construct a judicially-
administrable doctrine to implement Coase's theory. The resulting
doctrine, which we call the doctrine of ancillary delegations, allows judges
to distinguish delegations of federal law enforcement power made to
circumvent state immunity from those delegations made to implement a
Coasean structuring of government operations.
Part III takes the doctrine of ancillary delegations out for a dry run,
applying it to the qui tam provision of the Federal False Claims Act. The
Act proscribes fraud against the federal government and authorizes a qui
tam action to enforce that proscription. 35 We argue that the Act's qui tam
action can be understood as ancillary to Congress's effort to efficiently
structure detection and punishment of fraud against the federal
government. Congress first created this qui tam provision because the
federal government itself could not police fraud in a cost-effective
manner.36 Congress encouraged private citizens to help the federal
government discover and redress such fraud.37 Basically, Congress
34 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
35 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3730 (1994). Last term, the Supreme Court held that
states are not "persons" within the meaning of the False Claims Act and, thus, cannot
be sued for violations of the Act. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 787 (2000). The issue of qui tam suits against states, however,
remains an important question because Congress could amend the Federal False
Claims Act to include states within its reach. Further, other federal statutes authorize
qui tam actions that could be used against states. See id. at 790 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Thus, any analysis of the Federal False Claims Act's qui tam action will
also apply to these other federal qui tam actions.
36 See infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
37 See Evan H. Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99
YALE L.J. 341, 345 (1989) ("[Iln qui tam actions . . . society makes individuals the
representatives of the public for the purpose of enforcing a policy explicitly
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considered the relative cost of all-public enforcement versus a mix of
public and private enforcement and hoped the Act would minimize those
costs. Over time, Congress has further minimized these costs by
periodically fine-tuning the Act's qui tam action based on experience.3 8
Congress's object has always been better detection and punishment of
fraud against the government. Because Congress did not aim to
circumvent the Eleventh Amendment, the Act does not offend
Blatchfofrds dicta.
I. A COASEAN THEORY OF THE STATE
This Part develops the Coasean argument in two sections. Sec-
tion A briefly sketches Coase's argument in The Nature of the Firm. Sec-
tion B applies Coase's argument to the government context.
A. Coase's The Nature of the Firm
In his groundbreaking essay The Nature of the Firm,39 Coase
broaches a central question to microeconomics: Why do people form
firms that allocate the resources of production through internal man-
agement decisions instead of market transactions? 40 To demonstrate
the point, consider a law firm that needs secretarial services-typing
or inputting changes to documents, preparing filings, etc. The firm
can fulfill this need in many ways, but three options illustrate the
point. Option One lies at one extreme: the firm could make a. new
contract for each and every secretarial task. If a lawyer needs to have a
letter typed, she would enter the secretarial market and negotiate a
contract to type the letter. Under this option, the market allocates the
firm's secretarial work among different secretaries.
Option Two lies at the other extreme: instead of contracting out
each secretarial assignment, the firm hires secretaries as employees.41
The firm then assigns a group of lawyers to a secretary responsible for
their work. Under this option, the firm obtains secretarial help
formulated by legislation.") (quoting Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407,
418 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
38 See, e.g., id. at 343-44.
39 COASE, supra note 29.
40 *Coase defines a firm as follows: "It can, I think, be assumed that the distin-
guishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism." Id. at 36.
Coase further explains: "Within a firm ... market transactions are eliminated, and in
place of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted
the entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs production." Id. at 35-36.
41 In this case, the firm substitutes a single set of contracts-hiring the secretar-
ies-for many more contracts over time. As Coase has explained, "contracts are not
eliminated when there is a firm, but they are greatly reduced." Id. at 39.
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through a single market transaction-hiring the secretaries-and the
firm's administrators (not the market) allocate the secretarial
resources.
Option Three lies somewhere in between the first two: the firm
contracts with an agency for periodic secretarial services. Once a
month, the firm assesses its secretarial needs and negotiates an ar-
rangement for the next month; the agency's fee will vary depending
upon the firm's history of secretarial usage.42 Under this option, both
the market and the firm administrators allocate secretarial resources.
The firm administrators allocate the work among secretaries during
each month, and at the end of each month the market reallocates
based on various factors.
These three options illustrate how either the market or firm ad-
ministrators may allocate resources to varying degrees. Simply stated,
Coase sought to explain why a firm would opt for one method of allo-
cation over another.43 In our example, why would a law firm prefer
Option One, Two, or Three for providing secretarial services? Put dif-
ferently, why would a firm ever take a task in house and allocate the
resources administratively (Options Two and Three) instead of per-
forming the task through a series of market transactions (Option
One)?
Coase offered a straightforward answer: "The main reason why it
is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of
using the price mechanism."44 Negotiating and concluding a market
transaction is costly. Coase identified several types of transaction
costs: the cost "of discovering what the relevant prices are";45 "It]he
costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each ex-
change transaction which takes place on a market";46 and the inability
to make long-term contracts that will reduce the risk of periodic mar-
ket fluctuations. 47 Thus, in some cases, it might be cheaper for a firm
to perform a task in house than to repeatedly engage in market
transactions.
To illustrate our hypothetical law firm's choice, consider how the
firm might compare Option One to Option Two. Under Option One,
the firm would have to contact, negotiate with, and contract with a
42 Another variation on this theme would be for the firm to hire some secretaries
full time, but also to hire temps on an as-needed basis as the workload ebbs and flows.
43 See generally COASE, supra note 29.
44 Id. at 38.
45 Id. Coase writes that "[t] his cost may be reduced but it will not be eliminated
by the emergence of specialists who will sell this information." Id.
46 Id. at 38-39.
47 Id. at 39.
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secretary every time it wanted to type a letter or edit a document. The
multiple market transactions would waste valuable lawyer time, which
would be spent securing secretarial help instead of providing fee-gen-
erating legal services to clients.48 Under Option Two, the firm must
either divert lawyer time to administrating and allocating secretarial
help or hire a non-lawyer to perform that function. The question
then becomes whether the lawyer time lost to contracting in Option
One is greater than the cost of administering secretaries in Option
Two. Since no law firm we are aware of uses Option One, it must be
that contracting out individual secretarial assignments is more costly
than other options. The question for the firm, then, becomes
whether the cost of hiring secretaries as employees (Option Two) is
less than the cost of periodically contracting with a secretarial agency
(Option Three).
Firms perform the same cost comparison in deciding whether to
organize other tasks in house or through market transactions. For
example, will a law firm rely on the market to provide overnight docu-
ment delivery services (by contracting with Federal Express for each
package separately), develop its own delivery service in house, or
choose some mix of the two? 49 Will a law firm perform all document
reproduction in house, contract out for those services, or opt for some
mix of the two? A rational firm's choice will rest on the relative cost of
each option, which includes the transaction costs of each choice. In
sum, Coase's main insight was that this cost comparison dictates the
structure and size of a firm.
48 This is the economic idea of "opportunity cost." Simply put, the cost of any
activity is not only the money spent on engaging in that activity, but also the opportu-
nities foregone by engaging in the activity. See RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALY-
SiS OF LAW § 1.1, at 6 (5th ed. 1998). So, a lawyer's out-of-pocket expenses in
contracting for secretarial help might be quite small-perhaps only a few cents on
phone calls or other expenses. Yet, in spending time on contracting (time for which
the lawyer cannot bill) the lawyer forewent the opportunity to spend time performing
legal services (time for which the lawyer could bill her hourly rate). So, when we
factor in opportunity costs, Option One appears prohibitively expensive for a law
firm.
49 As with the secretarial help example, there are many ways the law firm could
mix in-house and outside delivery services. For example, the law firm could negotiate
periodic flat rates with an outside provider, or the law firm could do local deliveries in
house while contracting out all other deliveries.
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B. The State as a Firm
Commentators have spilled much ink modeling the economic
and other incentives that motivate government actors.50 In each case,
the commentator offers either a model that claims to describe the ac-
tual incentives at work in government decisionmaking, or offers a nor-
mative account of how government ought to work and corresponding
legal rules to implement that normative vision. Either way, these com-
mentators venture an all-encompassing model of the state, addressing
all facets of state action.
Our ambition here is much more limited. We simply claim that
the federal government does, in some instances, act like the firm de-
scribed in Coase's work. Specifically, the federal government some-
times decides to perform one task in house and contract out another
task based on the relative costs of those choices. This Section devel-
ops this limited claim.
Like a Coasean firm, government is an association of individuals
formed to pursue certain goals. In the preceding Section, we consid-
ered the law firm organized to provide legal services for a profit. In
this Section, consider the government charged with enforcing a spe-
cific regulatory scheme. 5' Assume that the government officials have
already decided that the regulatory scheme should exist;
5 2
50 See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT
(1962) (analyzing the decisionmaking methods of individuals in government); WIL-
LI M N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIAL ON LEGISLATION: STAT-
UTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 43-66 (2d ed. 1995) (describing various
models of government decisionmaking); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRIcKEY, LAW
AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 22 (1991) (same); see also, e.g., WI-
LAm N. ESKRIDGE, JR., An Historical and Critical Introduction to the Legal Process, in THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW, at li (1994)
(providing an editors' introduction that reviews evolution of views on government
decisionmaking).
51 This focus intentionally ignores larger questions, such as society's goals in cre-
ating a government and the appropriate ways to achieve those goals.
52 Of course, economic analysis also deals with the question of when government
should intervene in the marketplace. A classic example is the argument that govern-
ment must provide certain "public goods" that private actors would not otherwise
provide:
National defense is a frequently-stated example of a public good. It is diffi-
cult to have private national defense. The problem is the inability efficiently
to exclude consumers who receive the benefit if someone else provides the
defense. If someone else has Patriot missiles in your neighborhood, you
benefit without paying. Without exclusivity, many consumers get the good
for free. This joint consumption of the production of national defense by
both those who pay and those who do not is what leads to its characteriza-
tion as a classic public good. Because those who do not have to pay for the
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thus, the only question is how to enforce the regulatory
scheme.
53
To illustrate the government's choices in designing an enforce-
ment mechanism, consider the individual income tax. The govern-
ment's main task will be to detect and punish those who pay less tax
than they owe; the basic choice is whether to perform the task in
house, contract the task out, or have some mix of both. If the govern-
ment acts like a Coasean finn, it will decide based on the relative costs
of the options, including transaction costs. To see how this decision-
making process might work, let us work through some of the factors
that our hypothetical government might consider.
54
First, consider how in-house enforcement affects personnel
needs. Any regulatory scheme must address the twin goals of de-
tecting and deterring violations. In deciding whether to pay their
taxes, the rational taxpayer will weigh the expected cost of cheating
(the probability of getting caught times the penalty/cost of getting
caught) against the expected benefit of cheating (the probability of
not getting caught times the amount of tax not paid). 5 Conse-
quently, one way to deter violations is to raise the probability of detec-
good can free ride, less than the optimal amount will be provided, leading to
a standard argument for government intervention.
Timothy J. Muris, Economics and Consumer Protection, 60 AirrrRUST L.J. 103, 103
(1991).
53 The initial decision to enact a regulatory scheme will often involve considera-
tion of the costs of enforcing that scheme. This need not be the case. For example,
one government body might be responsible for creating the regulatory scheme while
another might be responsible'for deciding how to enforce it. This could happen
where the legislative branch enacts a broad regulatory scheme and then delegates the
details of enforcement to an administrative agency. On the other hand, a govern-
ment body might create a regulatory scheme with one type of enforcement mecha-
nism, but experience may reveal that enforcement is not successful. A later
legislature might then opt for a different enforcement mechanism. The Federal False
Claims Act is an example of this latter type of regulatory scheme. See supra note 35
and accompanying text.
54 For a fuller consideration of the factors and incentives involved in using
bounty programs as part of law enforcement, see generally Marsha J. Ferziger &
Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public Policy of Federal Civil
Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141 (examining the Insider Trading Act, False
Claims Act, and federal income tax bounty programs).
55 POSNER, supra note 48, § 7.2, at 242 ("In order to design a set of optimal crimi-
nal sanctions, we need a model of the criminal's behavior. The model can be very
simple: A person commits a crime because the expected benefits of the crime to him
exceed the expected costs."). This is a bit of an oversimplification. The rational tax-
payer will also weigh the cost of strategies for avoiding detection or punishment, such
as bribery and intimidation. See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement,
Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1974).
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tion. 56 To do so, the government could increase the number of audits
and thereby raise the likelihood of detection. 57 If enforcement is per-
formed in house, the government must hire enough auditors to con-
duct the needed audits.
In addition to the number of audits, the detail of the audits af-
fects the number of auditors hired. To adequately enforce the tax
laws, the government must conduct the audits in a manner likely to
detect violations. Otherwise, the audits will not increase the risk of
detection and thus will not deter violations. The nature of the audit
required will depend on how difficult it is to detect violations. How
much of the needed information is available from public sources or
sources other than the taxpayer? How easily may the taxpayer hide a
violation? How many violations, if any, can be detected from informa-
tion submitted to the government? The harder it is to detect a viola-
tion, the more detailed and extensive the audit process must be. The
more detailed and time-consuming the audits become, however, the
less audits a single person can perform in a given time period. Thus,
the extent of the audits will also effect the number of auditors hired.
So, labor will be one cost of in-house enforcement.58 Labor itself
has many cost components, wages and benefits being the most obvi-
ous., For example, recruiting and hiring employees costs money, as
does monitoring and evaluating employee performance. If the gov-
ernment has enough employees, it might need an entire department
devoted to employment matters. Simply put, the government will face
some of the same labor costs as a private company.
59
56 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN
THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 1, 14 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes
eds., 1974) ("If the aim simply were deterrence, the probability of conviction ...
could be raised close to 1, and punishments... could be made to exceed the gain: in
this way the number of offenses ... could be reduced almost at will."). Of course,
another way is to increase the penalty for the violation. As Professor Becker argues,
however, increases in probability of detection and punishment have other effects on
society that must be accounted for in modeling criminal law enforcement. See id. at
14-18.
57 Another way to accomplish a similar result would be to identify the types of
returns that are most likely to underpay the taxes and to disproportionately audit
those returns. In doing so, the government can raise the probability of detection for
those people most likely to violate the tax laws, but with fewer audits.
58 For other factors affecting the efficacy of law enforcement, see Becker & Stig-
ler, supra note 55, at 2-5.
59 The government also faces some costs not faced by private firms and does not
face some costs faced by private firms. On the former, the government must not
violate the Constitution when dealing with employees. For example, the government
must accord its employees procedural due process before disciplining or terminating
them. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). On the latter, the govern-
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In-house enforcement will also impose travel and monitoring
costs. Any centralized government, whether located in the national
capital or the state capital, faces the reality that not all violators are in
or near the capital city. Given this fact, the government must either
pay for travel to investigate violations in remote places, or maintain
regional field offices that police those locations. Either option carries
costs. For the traveling employee, the government bears travel and
lodging costs, as well as the cost of policing employee reimbursements
to prevent fraud. For the field office, the government bears the cost
of acquiring and maintaining the remote facility, as well as monitoring
the work of employees at the remote site.
Second, consider contracting out enforcement of the individual
income tax.60 For example, the government could contract with an
accounting firm to conduct audits of suspected tax violators and a law
firm6 1 to bring enforcement actions. 62 The government could either
hire these firms on an ongoing basis, for a specified period of time, or
on a case-by-case basis, or the government could delegate these func-
tions to private citizens through the qui tam action.63 Each option has
ment may exempt itself from some laws that it imposes on private employers. For
example, governments enjoy sovereign immunity from civil liability. See Federal Tort
Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994) (defining the scope of the United States's tort
liability).
60 Two commentators propose an all-out bounty system, which would allow the
market to select who will enforce public laws, as opposed to in-house hiring decisions
by the government (similar to those by private firms). See Becker & Stigler, supra note
55, at 13-16. Of course, such a scheme would require some government regulation to
police abuses. See id. at 15-16.
61 For the first fifty years under the Constitution, the United States Government
relied on private lawyers to prosecute federal crimes. See Roger Conner et al., The
Office of U.S. Attorney and Putblic Safety: A Brief History Prepared for the "Changing Role of
U.S. Attorneys' Offices in Public Safety" Symposium, 28 CAP. U. L. REv. 753, 755 (2000);
Seth P. Waxman, Twins at Birth: Civil Rights and the Role of the Solicitor General, 75 IND.
L.J. 1297, 1300 (2000).
62 In performing their enforcement functions, these private firms will act like the
Coaesean firm described above in Part I.A., deciding the proper mix of in-house and
outside help based on the relative costs of each option as well as the applicable trans-
action costs. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text. For example, the private
law firm must decide whether to contract out factual investigation to a private firm, or
to provide the service from within by hiring employees to do so.
63 The current federal tax laws invite private participation in the detection of tax
violations by offering a bounty to any person who provides information leading to
collection of unpaid taxes. See I.R.C. § 7623 (1994).
The Secretary, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, is authorized
to pay such sums, not exceeding in the aggregate the sum appropriated
therefore, as he may deem necessary for detecting and bringing to trial and
punishment persons guilty of violating the internal revenue laws, or conniv-
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transaction costs-the out-of-pocket expenses and opportunity cost of
identifying, negotiating, and contracting with the private firms. Also,
the government would face agency costs-the cost of monitoring the
private firm so that it does not make wasteful or fraudulent charges to
the government.
Third, the government might consider some mix of in-house and
outside enforcement efforts. For example, the government could hire
private accounting firms to conduct audits and leave enforcement ac-
tions to government lawyers. Employing the government lawyers
would pose the costs associated with in-house enforcement, while con-
tracting with the private accounting firm would pose the transaction
and agency costs of outside enforcement.
The precise mix of in-house and outside contracting selected by
our hypothetical, Coasean government will depend on the empirical
question of how much each option costs. In the abstract, we cannot
predict any per se optimal mix of in-house and outside enforcement
that fits all regulatory schemes. Rather, that decision depends heavily
on the costs associated with various enforcement contexts.
II. IMPLEMENTING COASE: THE DOCTRINE OF ANCILLARY DELEGATIONS
Part I revealed that delegation of law enforcement to actors
outside the federal government can, in certain circumstances, play a
role in structuring effective federal law enforcement. This insight an-
swers the Court's challenge in Blatchford, which was to articulate some
legitimate reason for delegating the United States's law enforcement
power to private citizens. 64 So, whether a delegation of federal law
enforcement power overcomes state immunity depends on the United
States's object or purpose in making the delegation. If the United
States did so in a good faith attempt to better structure federal law
enforcement, the delegation should be upheld. If the United Staies
did so mainly to circumvent state immunity, the delegation should be
struck down.
To implement these ideas, we need a doctrine that properly
blends Coase's essential insight with Blatchford's fear of circumvention.
ing at the same, in cases where such expenses are not otherwise provided for
by law.
Id.; Treas. Reg. 301.7623-1 (a) (1998) ("A district director may approve such reward as
he deems suitable for information that leads to the detection and punishment of any
person guilty of violating any internal revenue law, or conniving at the same."); see also
Ferziger & Currell, supra note 54, at 1142-43 (reviewing various incentives created in
federal bounty programs, including the Internal Revenue Service program).
64 See Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 785-86 (1991); see also
supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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Specifically, we need a doctrinal model borrowed from another area
of law that has three important features. First, the doctrine must test
the legality of a specific type of conduct. Here, the conduct would be
delegation of the United States's power to sue the states. Second, the
doctrine must recognize that the suspect conduct is lawful when en-
gaged in for certain reasons, but unlawful when engaged in for other
reasons. Here, the delegation is allowed if done to better structure
federal law enforcement, but not allowed if done to circumvent state
immunity. Third, the doctrine must provide a rule or mode of analy-
sis to distinguish cases where the suspect conduct is engaged in for
permissible reasons from cases where the conduct is engaged in for
impermissible reasons.
As Part II explains, the antitrust doctrine of ancillary restraints
supplies an apt doctrinal model. First, the doctrine applies to a sus-
pect class of conduct-restraints of trade. Second, the doctrine recog-
nizes that restraints of trade are lawful if created for permissible
reasons, but unlawful if created for forbidden reasons. Third, and
most importantly, the doctrine provides a mode of analysis for distin-
guishing conduct undertaken for permissible reasons from conduct
undertaken for impermissible reasons.
This Part has two sections. Section A explains the relevant con-
tours of the antitrust doctrine of ancillary restraints, as well as how the
doctrine fits the three criteria needed for our model doctrine. Sec-
tion B then uses the model to construct a doctrine of ancillary delega-
tion out of the Coasean theory of government arrangements discussed
in Part I.B.
One caveat about the discussion in Section A-our purpose is to
use the antitrust doctrine of ancillary restraints to model a similar test
in the state immunity context. We focus on the doctrine's main fea-
tures and how the doctrine works in practice. We do not venture any
descriptive or normative claims about the doctrine's role within anti-
trust, as that would be well beyond the scope of this Article. Rather,
regardless of its acceptance within the antitrust community, we offer
the ancillary restraint doctrine to illustrate a mode of analysis we find
useful in addressing this Article's state immunity issue.
A. The Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints
A fundamental dilemma of American antitrust law is that its basic
statutory prohibition cannot possibly mean what it says. The Sherman
Act, our first antitrust statute, begins: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
20011
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
clared to be illegal." 65 A textual literalist could argue that this statute
means what it says: every contract, combination or conspiracy that re-
strains trade is illegal. The problem with this view, however, is that all
contracts and combinations restrain trade because they legally bind
the contracting or combining parties to deal with one another and
not with other potential parties. 66 The literalist reading, then, would
outlaw all contracts, as well as all combinations such as partnerships
and joint ventures.67 The Sherman Act would effectively outlaw eco-
nomic activity and bring the United States economy to a halt.68
Fortunately, with one exception,69 the Supreme Court has re-
fused to apply this interpretation of the Sherman Act. 70 Rather, early
on, the Court interpreted the Act's broad language to prohibit only
unreasonable restraints of trade.71 Of course, this rule required some
further standard or doctrine to distinguish reasonable and unreasona-
ble restraints of trade. The ancillary restraint doctrine is one method
of doing so. 72 In its first Sherman Act case, the Court explained that a
65 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
66 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A PoLIcy AT WAR WITH ITSELF
135-36 (1978) ("When men join together in corporations or partnerships, or in any
economic unit of more than one person, they either explicitly or tacitly accept the
elimination of market rivalry between themselves. Joint effort organized by adminis-
trative direction replaces the forces of the marketplace.").
67 See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
[T] he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so
simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concern-
ing trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is their
very essence. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates or perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
Id.
68 See BORK, supra note 66, at 135-36 ("Since cooperation and division of labor
within such economic units is essential to the tasks of production and distribution, it
is impossible to enforce a legal rule that makes the agreed elimination of rivalry
unlawful.").
69 In its first Sherman Act case, the Court read the Act to prohibit all restraints of
trade. See United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 339-41 (1897). This
interpretation lasted only a year, with the Court adopting a narrower approach in
United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 567-68 (1898).
70 Even avid textualists such as Justice Antonin Scalia criticize such a contextual
literalism. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 23-24 (1997).
71 Both historical and economic reasoning support the Supreme Court's rejec-
tion of the literalist reading. See BORK, supra note 66, at 50-71, 107-15.
72 American antitrust law has developed a wide range of tests and doctrines to
determine whether different types of restraints are lawful. See generally LAWRENCE A.
SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK
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contract or combination was not unlawful if its restraint of trade was
"an indirect result, however inevitable and whatever its extent," but
only if the restraint was "the object of the contract, combination, or
conspiracy."7 3 Three years later in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co.,74 ChiefJustice Taft, while ajudge on the Sixth Circuit, elaborated
on this approach. He wrote that a restraint of trade is valid if "the
covenant embodying.it is merely ancillary to the main purpose of a
lawful contract," and the restraint is "necessary" to achieving that con-
tract's purpose.7 5 Under a rule of reason approach, if the restraint
"exceeds the necessity presented by the main purpose of the lawful
contract, it is void."
'7 6
So, a contract or combination is illegal if its main object or purpose
is to restrain trade. The Court has referred to such restraints as "na-
ked restraints of trade." 77 For example, a cartel agreement, where the
parties' main object is to eliminate price competition, is a classic na-
ked restraint of trade.7 8 When a cartel does so, it raises prices and
restricts output, thus harming consumers, without providing any off-
setting benefit to consumers. The cartel's restraint of trade is "naked"
because it stands alone, unadorned with any pro-competitive benefits.
Conversely, if the restraint's main object or purpose is to promote
an economically beneficial transaction, the restraint is likely to be
valid.79 The Court has referred to such restraints as "ancillary" to an
165-449 (2000) (discussing various approaches to incorporating restraints in antitrust
law, ranging from the per se rule to the "rule of reason").
73 United States v. E.G. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895).
74 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), ajfd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
75 Id. at 282.
76 Id.
77 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)
78 See Boax, supra note 66, at 66-67. Judge Richard Posner describes the effect
of the Sherman Act on cartels:
[T] he illegality of cartels under the Sherman Act was established in the early
years of the act; and, since cartels are difficult to conceal, the act, despite its
rather feeble sanctions and lackluster enforcement, apparently succeeded in
virtually eliminating them f om the industries subject to it. The elimination
of the formal cartel from those industries is an impressive, and remains the
major, achievement of American antitrust law.
RICHARD A. PoSNER, ANTRrusT: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTrIVE 39 (1976).
79 A finding that a restraint of trade is ancillary to an economically beneficial
transaction means that the restraint is reviewed under the less stringent rule of reason
analysis. The rule of reason test is fairly deferential, and courts usually uphold the
challenged restraint of trade. See E. THOMAS SULLrvAN &JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDER-
STANDING ANTrrRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS § 4.05, at 122 (3d ed. 1998)
(characterizing a restraint as per se illegal or subject to rule of reason "in many re-
spects determines the result" of the case); see also Val D. Ricks & R. Chet Loftis, Seeing
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otherwise lawful enterprise.8 0 For example, a computer software com-
pany may hire a trainee with the agreement that the trainee not com-
pete with the company when she leaves.8 1 The parties' main objective
is to complete an economically beneficial transaction-the trainee will
receive compensation, valuable training, and perhaps proprietary in-
formation, and the software company will receive the trainee's ser-
vices. But, that transaction will not occur without the non-compete
agreement, which is a restraint of trade. For, if the trainee can simply
get the training and proprietary information and seek a better job
elsewhere, the software company has no incentive to provide training.
The non-compete clause (the restraint of trade) is necessary for the
economically beneficial transaction. In antitrust parlance, the re-
straint of trade is ancillary to the pro-competitive transaction.
While logically sound, the ancillary-naked restraint distinction
needs elaboration if judges are to implement it in deciding cases. In
reducing the theoretical distinction to a working doctrine, courts have
developed a two-step analysis. First, the party defending the chal-
lenged restraint must show that the restraint is part of a larger transac-
tion that has economically beneficial, pro-competitive aspects. 8 2
Second, the restraint must be necessary to achieve the pro-competitive
aspects of the transaction.8 3 If the challenged restraint survives these
two steps, it is deemed an ancillary restraint.84
the Diagonal Clearly: Telling Vertical from Horizontal in Antitrust Law, 28 U. TOL. L. REV.
151, 155 (1996).
Rule of reason cases are often not brought; they are too expensive to prose-
cute, especially given the significant chance that tlhe defendant might pre-
vail. In fact, in the area of market allocations, because rule of reason analysis
so often ultimately permits vertical market allocations, the horizontal/verti-
cal determination may be the key issue in a case.
Id. We do not discuss the rule of reason above because it is not germane to our
Eleventh Amendment analysis. Recall that in the Eleventh Amendment context, our
concern is whether Congress's object or purpose in delegating law enforcement au-
thority is to circumvent the Eleventh Amendment. So, in constructing a doctrine to
answer that question, we are looking to an antitrust doctrine that performs a similar
function: determining the purpose or object of a challenged restraint of trade. The
ancillary restraint doctrine described in the text, and not the rule of reason analysis,
performs that function.
80 See Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282.
81 See id. at 85 F. at 281 (noting that a partner's covenant not to compete with
other members of a partnership is a valid ancillary restraint).
82 Id. at 282.
83 Id.
84 As noted above, a court will uphold an ancillary restraint only if it survives
scrutiny under the "rule of reason" test. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying
text. "Rule of reason" is shorthand for analysis of whether an agreement's pro-com-
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To see how this doctrine works in practice, consider the Seventh
Circuit's decision in Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises.85 That case
involved an agreement between a home furniture and appliance retail
sales firm and a home improvement (tools, lumber, building materi-
als, etc.) retail sales firm.86 The firms agreed to occupy a single build-
ing divided into two retail sales spaces, with each firm operating out of
a single retail space with its own entrance.87 Further, the firms agreed
not to sell certain goods within the other firm's product line.8 8 When
the home improvement firm threatened to violate the agreement by
selling home appliances, the home furniture and appliance firm
brought suit to enjoin the home improvement firm from doing so.89
The home improvement firm argued that the parties' agreement was
an unlawful horizontal agreement prohibiting product line competi-
tion.90 On appeal, the question was whether this restraint of trade was
valid.91
The Seventh Circuit held that the product line restraint was a
valid ancillary restraint.92 The court first asked whether the chal-
lenged restraint was part of a larger pro-competitive transaction.
93
The home furniture and appliance firm defended the restraint as part
of a joint venture that both expanded retail space and increased cus-
tomer convenience. 94 The joint venture produced over 130,000 addi-
tional square feet of retail space, adding to competition in the firms'
respective markets.95 Moreover, because the firms' product lines com-
plemented one another-customers in the market for furniture could
petitive aspects outweigh the harm to competition imposed by the ancillary restraint
of trade. This test is fairly deferential and usually leads to upholding the restraint.
See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 372-78 (1933) (up-
holding an exclusive selling agreement intended to bolster the ailing coal industry
during the Depression).
85 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985).
86 Id. at 187.
87 Id.
88 Id. For example, the home furnishing and appliance firm agreed not to sell
items such as lawn mowers, building materials, and lumber, while the home improve-
ment firm agreed not to sell items such as major appliances and furniture. Id.
89 Id. at 187-88.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 188.
92 Id. at 191.
93 Id. at 188-89 ("A court must distinguish between 'naked' restraints, those in
which the restriction on competition is unaccompanied by new production or prod-
ucts, and 'ancillary' restraints, those that are a part of a larger endeavor whose success
they promote.").
94 Id. at 189-90.
95 See id. at 187, 189-90.
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browse home appliances, and vice versa-the firms increased con-
sumer convenience by providing a single site with a "full line of goods
for furnishing and maintaining a home."96 Because of the increased
retail space and customer convenience, the firms' overall venture was
pro-competitive and likely benefited consumers.
97
Second, the court determined that the challenged restraint pro-
moted the venture's pro-competitive benefits.98 In reaching this con-
clusion, the court considered the circumstances at the time the parties
made their agreement, without the benefit of hindsight.99 From that van-
tage point, the product line restraint made the deal possible. The
court explained:
[The home furniture and appliance firm] spent substantial sums in
advertising to attract customers to its stores, where it displayed and
demonstrated the appliances. It might be tempting for another re-
tailer to take a free ride on these efforts. Once [the home furniture
and appliance firm] has persuaded a customer to purchase a color
TV, its next door neighbor might try to lure the customer away by
quoting a lower price. It could afford to do this if, for example, it
simply kept the TV sets in boxes and let [the home furniture and
appliance firm] bear the costs of sales personnel and demonstra-
tions. [The home furniture and appliance firm] would not con-
tinue to do the work while its neighbor took the sales. It would do
less demonstrating and promotion, to the detriment of consumers
who valued the information.' 00
Without the product line restraint, neither firm would have an incen-
tive to do the promotion or advertising necessary to attract customers
to their unique arrangement. Thejoint venture, with its pro-competi-
tive benefits of increased retail space and customer convenience,
would not have occurred. Thus, the court concluded that the product
line restraint was an ancillary restraint. 101
96 Id. at 187.
97 See id. at 190 ("As the district court put it, the parties 'hoped to attract more
customers because of the proximity of two stores, selling different but complimentary
items for home sale.'").
98 Id. at 189-90.
99 See id. at 189.
100 Id. at 190.
101 See id. at 190-91. After holding that the product line restraint was ancillary to a
pro-competitive joint venture, the next question was whether this ancillary restraint
passed the rule of reason test. As the Seventh Circuit noted, the first question under
rule of reason analysis is usually whether the parties to the restraint had substantial
market power in the relevant market. Id. at 191. "Unless the firms have the power to
raise price by curtailing output, their agreement is unlikely to harm consumers, and it
makes sense to understand their cooperation as benign or beneficial." Id. In Polk
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While Polk Bros. illustrates the ancillary restraint doctrine in ac-
tion, it also raises questions about how aggressively courts scrutinize
claims that a restraint is ancillary. Specifically, if we are to frame a
judicially applicable doctrine, we need to know how closely courts
scrutinize parties' claims that (1) the challenged restraint is part of a
larger, economically beneficial transaction, and (2) the challenged re-
straint promotes the pro-competitive aspects of that transaction. Both
Polk Bros. and relevant Supreme Court decisions suggest the judicial
stance toward these issues.
First, language in Polk Bros. suggests that the Seventh Circuit ac-
cepts a party's facially rational argument that its transaction has pro-
competitive aspects. "[A] court must be very sure that a category of
acts is anti-competitive before condemning that category" as a naked
restraint of trade. 10 2 Similarly, the Supreme Court has explained that
"[i] t is only after considerable experience with certain business rela-
tionships that courts classify them as [unlawful naked restraints]. 
u"03
Until that time, the court will treat the restraint as ancillary.
104
Bros., however, the home improvement firm challenged the product line restraint
solely on the ground that it was an unlawful naked restraint. Id. Thus, the court in
Polk Bros. never applied the rule of reason.
102 Id. at 189 (emphasis added).
103 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972).
104 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979) (quot-
ing the language used in Topco); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
49-50 (1977) (holding that a restraint is a per se illegal naked restraint only if the
restraint is "manifestly anticompetitive"). Using a similar rationale, the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit recently rejected per se treatment of the United States's claim that
Microsoft had illegally tied purchase of its Windows operating system to purchase of
its Internet Explorer web browser. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,
84-95 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Current Supreme Court precedent treats product tying as
per se illegal when the tying company has market power in the tying product market,
and the product tie forecloses a substantial amount of commerce. See Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992);Jefferson Parish Hosp. v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12-18 (1984). The court agreed that Microsoft had market power
in the operating system market, that the Windows operating system and Internet Ex-
plorer web browser were separate products, and that Microsoft had tied the purchase
of Windows to the purchase of Internet Explorer. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 81-89.
Yet, the court nonetheless rejected per se treatment because the evidence showed the
possibility of substantial efficiencies when a software developer integrates an applica-
tions platform, here, the operating system, with "complementary software functional-
ity," here, features of the web brdwser. See id. at 89-90 ("Applying per se analysis to
such an amalgamation creates undue risks of error and of deterring welfare-enhanc-
ing innovation."). Given this uncertainty, the court held that it was better to apply a
rule of reason analysis to such conduct, rather than flatly reject the conduct and its
possible accompanying efficiencies. See id. at 89-95.
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Second, Polk Bros. suggests that courts should defer to the parties'
decision that the restraint promoted their pro-competitive transac-
tion.10 5 For example, Polk Bros. states that a court must ask whether
the restraint "arguably" promoted the pro-competitive transaction. 10
6
Similarly, the Supreme Court has suggested that a restraint be treated
as ancillary if it may promote competition, or if the court- has "some
doubt" that the challenged conduct is a naked restraint. 10 7 These
passages suggest that courts should accept rational arguments and not
require strong showings.
Not surprisingly, in determining whether the restraint was neces-
sary to accomplish the parties' pro-competitive transaction, the Su-
preme Court has considered whether the parties could have done so
without the restraint. If obvious alternative means would achieve com-
parable benefits, the restraint was not necessary. For example, in
NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma,'0 8 the Court ad-
dressed NCAA rules that restricted member schools' ability to contract
for broadcast of the their school's football games. The NCAA de-
fended the rules as necessary to foster competition among schools,
which would make the NCAA's product-here, college football
games-more attractive to viewers and thus better able to compete in
the marketplace of entertainment. 10 9 While the Court accepted this
goal as legitimate, it concluded that the NCAA's broadcast restrictions
were not necessary to do so. 110 The Court rested its conclusion, in
part, on its observation that other NCAA rules, which did not restrain
trade, were "clearly sufficient" to achieve the NCAA's goals." 1
Judicial review of each step of the ancillary restraint analysis is
quite deferential. This deference is prudential, recognizing limits in
105 See Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 189 (noting that the new venture was meant to ex-
pand output and likely to benefit consumers).
106 See id.
107 See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 23.
108 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
109 See id. at 117.
110 See id. at 119. The Court explained the point as follows:
The television plan is not even arguably tailored to serve such an interest [in
equalizing competition among teams and divisions]. It does not regulate
the amount of money that any college may spend on its football program,
nor the way in which the colleges may use the revenues that are generated by
their football programs, whether derived from the sale of television rights,
the sale of tickets, or the sale of concessions-or program advertising. The
plan simply imposes a restriction on one source of revenue that is more im-
portant to some colleges than to others.
Id.
111 See id.
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both judicial expertise and fact-finding ability. Courts are not experts
in economic analysis.1 2 While microeconomic theory derives from
simple assumptions about rational human behavior, the theory be-
comes difficult to apply in complicated market settings, with econo-
mists even disagreeing about the proper analysis.113 Because federal
judges are not professional economists, they ought not referee eco-
nomic debates in deciding cases. Further, real world markets are dy-
namic, and even the best litigation process cannot reconstruct all the
factors surrounding the challenged conduct. For these reasons,
courts uphold the challenged conduct unless their limited economic
expertise and fact-finding ability clearly indicate otherwise.
In sum, the doctrine of ancillary restraints gives judges a tool to
distinguish those restraints created with a purpose to defeat competi-
tion from those that only incidentally restrict competition in the ser-
vice of a larger pro-competitive transaction. The doctrine does so by
asking judges to apply a two-step analysis:
(1) Is the challenged restraint part of a larger transaction with pro-
competitive effects? The party defending the challenged restraint
bears the burden with respect to this question.
(2) Is the challenged restraint necessary to achieve the pro-compet-
itive aspects of the larger transaction? The court should ask this
question from the parties' perspective at the time they entered the
challenged agreement. After considering possible alternatives, the
court should defer to a plausible argument for necessity.
The next section uses this model to construct a doctrine of ancillary
delegations for state immunity.
B. The Doctrine of Ancillary Delegations
The Sherman Act did not outlaw all restraints of trade. 1 4 Rather,
the Supreme Court distinguishes restraints of trade based on their
purpose. Those used to achieve an impermissible purpose, harming
competition, are invalid naked restraints. Those used to achieve a
112 See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972) ("The fact is that
courts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic problems."). The Court
has also decided that conduct that is "plainly anticompetitive" is per se illegal. Broad.
Music, 441 U.S. at 7-8. By designating certain conduct as per se illegal, the Court
avoids an extended economic inquiry into each instance of the conduct, which in-
quiry courts are generally ill-suited to perform. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 609-10. The
Court has also recognized its limited economic expertise outside the antitrust context.
See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 308-09 (1997) (noting that judges are
not qualified to do complex economic analysis in dormant Commerce Clause cases).
113 See Gen. Motors, 519 U.S. at 308-09.
114 See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
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permissible purpose, promoting competition, are valid ancillary re-
straints. The doctrine of ancillary restraints helps courts determine
which type of restraint a case presents.
Similarly, state immunity should not prohibit all delegations of
federal law enforcement power, only those enacted for an impermissi-
ble purpose. To formulate a state immunity non-delegation doctrine,
then, we need to identify permissible and impermissible purposes.
Recall from our discussion above that Congress and the President
have a legitimate interest in creating effective institutional arrange-
ments, including effective law enforcement arrangements.1 1 5 Con-
versely, the states have an interest in Congress not deputizing private
parties solely to circumvent state immunity. These are our contrasting
purposes. On the one hand, a delegation made to circumvent state
immunity is invalid. Drawing on antitrust terminology, call this a "na-
ked delegation." Conversely, a delegation made as part of a larger
effort to efficiently structure federal law enforcement would be valid.
Call this an "ancillary delegation."
Next, courts will need a doctrine to distinguish naked and ancil-
lary delegations in specific cases. We can model such a doctrine after
the two-step ancillary restraint doctrine in antitrust. The first step of
the antitrust doctrine asks whether the restraint is part of a larger, pro-
competitive transaction. In the state immunity context, the analogous
question is whether a delegation of federal law enforcement power to
private actors is part of a larger effort to structure effective federal law
enforcement. As in antitrust, the burden should be on the party sup-
porting the challenged action to answer this question. In antitrust,
the burden is on the defendant; for state immunity, the burden
should be on the party seeking to overcome state immunity.1 16 If the
delegation is not ancillary, then the delegation stands alone, with no
other purpose than to circumvent state immunity. Such naked dele-
gations should be invalid.
115 See supra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.
116 This burden is consistent with the general constitutional law requirement that
the government must offer some purpose behind its challenged conduct. See, e.g.,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (noting that government must
have a legitimate purpose behind a law that burdens an ordinary liberty interest);
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) ("A land use regulation does not
effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does not
'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.'") (quoting Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985) (noting that government must offer some legitimate
purpose in support of a law that discriminates on a basis other than race or gender).
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The party seeking to overcome state immunity cannot satisfy the
first step simply by claiming that the delegation of law enforcement
power saves money by decreasing the workload of federal law enforce-
ment officials. All such delegations potentially do so by shifting the
cost of detecting and litigating legal violations to private parties.
117
Rather, the federal government must show a specific law enforcement
problem posed by the context in which the delegation is made. For
example, to justify the delegation made by the False Claims Act,118 the
federal government must identify a specific law enforcement problem
associated with detecting and prosecuting false claims against the fed-
eral government. As we will see below, such fraud may be hard to
detect, creating a specific need for institutional arrangements de-
signed to ferret out offenders. 119
The second step of the antitrust doctrine asked whether the chal-
lenged restraint on trade was necessary to achieve the pro-competitive
aspects of the larger transaction. In the state immunity context, the
analogous question is whether the challenged delegation is necessary
to solve the specific law enforcement problem posed by the regulatory
context. For example, in the False Claims Act, is the qui tam action
necessary to address the specific problem of detecting fraud against
the government? As in the antitrust context, this question should 'be
answered on the information available at the time the challenged decision was
made. In antitrust, this means at the time the parties created the chal-
lenged restraint of trade; for state immunity, this means at the time
Congress enacted the challenged delegation. 120
The only real question left is how carefully courts should scruti-
nize the federal government's claim of necessity. The same pruden-
tial limitations that counseled deference in the antitrust context
counsel deference in the state immunity context. Courts are not ex-
perts in tailoring effective law enforcement arrangements. Further,
courts are not well situated to perform the factual inquiry necessary to
judge the government's decision whether delegation was feasible.
117 As discussed above, see supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text, whether a
specific delegation actually saves money depends on the relative transaction costs of
in-house and outside enforcement.
118 See infra Part III.A.3. The Federal False Claims Act targets private contractors
who defraud the federal government. The Act allows the government and private
individuals acting on behalf of the government to file suit against parties allegedly
defrauding the federal government.
119 See infra notes 157-81 and accompanying text.
120 Cf. Minnesota v. Cloverleaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463-64 (1981) (noting
that an equal protection challenge is decided on information available to government
at the time it acted).
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This does not mean that courts should ignore whether non-delegation
alternatives were available. Indeed, the availability of obvious alterna-
tives may undercut the plausibility of the government's case for neces-
sity. However, in the end, for institutional reasons, courts should
defer to a plausible government argument for necessity.
C. The AncillaryDelegation Doctrine Stated and Applied
Before turning to the False Claims Act, we offer a quick summary
of the newly minted ancillary delegation doctrine as well as an illustra-
tive application. First, the doctrine is as follows:
2 1
(1) Is the challenged delegation part of a larger effort to address
specific law enforcement problems posed by the given regulatory
context? Heavy federal law enforcement work load is not a specific
law enforcement problem. The party seeking to overcome state im-
munity bears the burden with respect to this question.
(2) Is the challenged delegation of federal law enforcement power
necessary to solve the specific law enforcement problem? The court
should answer this question based on the information before Con-
gress at the time it acted. After considering possible alternatives,
the court should defer to a plausible argument for necessity.
Second, let us take this new doctrine out for a spin by applying it
to the facts in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,'22 the case that gave
us the non-delegation dicta. In Blatchford, an Alaskan Native village
brought a federal suit against the State of Alaska challenging the con-
stitutionality of an allegedly discriminatory municipal funding
scheme. 23 The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that the Elev-
enth Amendment protected Alaska from the village's federal court
suit.'
2 4
In the Supreme Court, the village argued that state immunity
should not apply because the United States had delegated its federal
121 Our proposed ancillary delegation doctrine is similar in structure to the Su-
preme Court's current test for reviewing federal legislation enacted under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 provides: "The Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5. In deciding whether a challenged statute enforces the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court asks two questions. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
530-32 (1997). First, has Congress identified a pattern of Fourteenth Amendment
violations that require remedy or deterrence? Id. at 530-31. Second, is the chal-
lenged statute tailored to punishing or deterring the identified constitutional viola-
tions? Id. at 532.
122 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
123 Id. at 778.
124 Id.
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law enforcement power to the Indian tribes. 125 Earlier this century,
the Supreme Court had held that the United States could file suit on
behalf of an Indian tribe to protect the tribe's rights, and state immu-
nity would not bar the United States from bringing such suits in fed-.
eral court.126 The village argued that Congress subsequently
delegated this power to litigate for the Indian tribes back to the
tribes.' 27 The village relied on the following statute:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions,
brought by any Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly
recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, wherein the matter in
controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.
12 8
For our immediate purposes, the question is whether this statute
should be considered a valid ancillary delegation of the United
States's power to sue the states in federal court.
The statute in Blatchford fails the first step of the ancillary delega-
tion doctrine. Under the first step, the village must demonstrate that
Congress enacted the above-quoted statute in response to a unique
law enforcement need in the area of tribal rights. The village would
fall for three reasons. First, the statute's text does not identify any
specific area of law enforcement need. Rather, the statute allows suit
for all arising under claims brought by Indian tribes, regardless of
whether the claims relate to uniquely tribal interests. The statute's
focus is who brings the suit, not what the suit involves.
Second, the statute's legislative history does not mention any spe-
cial law enforcement need arising in the tribal context.' 29 This silence
is fatal because the ancillary delegation doctrine places the burden on
the party challenging immunity to show that the statute had such a
purpose. Unless Congress identifies some unique law enforcement
need, a party cannot carry its burden under step one.
Third, the statute's history suggests that it was not aimed at reme-
dying any law enforcement need. At the time Congress enacted the
statute, federal law placed a jurisdictional minimum of $10,000 on
125 See id. at 783. The village pressed two other arguments against state immunity.
First, the village argued that state immunity did not apply against other sovereigns,
such as the sovereign Indian nations. See id. at 779. Second, the village argued that
Congress had abrogated the state's immunity. See id. at 786. The Court rejected both
contentions. Id. at 780-82, 786-88.
126 See United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 195 (1926).
127 Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 783.
128 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1994).
129 See H.R. Rep. No. 2040 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.AN. 3145.
2001]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
arising under suits.13° The statute's title suggests that Congress simply
removed the jurisdictional minimum for federal arising under suits
brought by Indian tribes: "To amend the Judicial Code to permit In-
dian tribes to maintain civil actions in Federal district courts without
regard to the $10,000 limitation, and for other purposes." 131
Even if some unique law enforcement need existed in the tribal
context, the statute fails the second prong of the ancillary delegation
doctrine because it is not tailored to any conceivable law enforcement
need. The statute grants tribes jurisdiction in the broad category of
all "civil actions . . . aris[ing] under" federal law. 13 2 This grant indis-
criminately mixes private rights of action with actions affected with a
public law enforcement character. Congress made no effort to limit
the delegation to any subset of federal laws. Such a generic, blanket
delegation evinces no tailoring whatsoever.
The statute in Blatchford rather clearly fails the ancillary delega-
tion doctrine. This is not surprising since the best explanation for the
statute had nothing to do with fixing a problem in federal law enforce-
ment. This example should illustrate that an ancillary delegation doc-
trine offers states strong protection from accidental or mistaken
delegations of federal law enforcement power. Unless Congress ex-
pressly identifies a unique problem in federal law enforcement, either
in statutory text or legislative history, the analysis never gets past step
one. Step one, then, applies a kind of clear statement rule to delega-
tions of federal law enforcement power. Such clear statement rules
are a standard device the Supreme Court uses to protect states from
inadvertent federal encroachment on their sovereignty. 133
III. THE FEDERAL FALSE CLAIMS Acr As ANcILLARY DELEGATION
Part I explained that some delegations of federal law enforce-
ment power should overcome state immunity, and Part II crafted a
doctrine of ancillary delegations to implement this insight. Part III
now applies the doctrine to the Federal False Claims Act's qui tam
action. Section A traces the evolution of the qui tam action from its
130 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964).
131 Act of Oct. 10, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-635, 80 Stat. 880 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1362 (1994)). The Supreme Court has also credited this as the purpose of the stat-
ute. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 784.
132 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1964).
133 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 287-89, 326
(1994) (discussing the Supreme Court's federalism-based canons of statutory con-
struction); Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39
WM. & MARY L. REv. 1191, 1283-86 (1998) (discussing various clear statement rules
the Supreme Court uses to protect the states).
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English origins through its current American incarnation. Section B
then applies the doctrine of ancillary delegations in light of this
history.
A. The History of the Federal False Claims Act
1. English Origins
The qui tam action has roots in the English common law and was
practiced as early as the thirteenth century. 34 Under English prac-
tice, private citizens could bring actions to enforce the law, even when
they had no personal stake in the litigation.13 5 Initially, qui tam ac-
tions arose as forum shopping devices.' 3 6 Ordinarily, local English
courts had jurisdiction over private wrongs,137 but those courts were
reputedly ineffective and unjust.'38 The qui tam action allowed private
litigants to escape the local courts: private parties would sue in the
King's name, thereby allowing them access to the royal courts.'
3 9
Slowly, Parliament replaced the English common-law qui tam ac-
tion with qui tam statutes.140 As Parliament did so, the focus of the qui
tam action shifted from forum shopping to supplementing law en-
forcement. 141 This trend began when a version of the qui tam action
known as an "informer's action" became common. 42 The informer's
action authorized private informers to bring suit to redress public
wrongs; in return, the informer received a bounty calculated as a per-
centage of the amount recovered from the wrongdoer. 43 This incen-
134 SeeJ. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REv. 539, 567-68 (2000); Note, The History and Development of
Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 83.
135 See Beck, supra note 134, at 552-53 (summarizing Blackstone's description of a
qui tam statute).
136 See Note, supra note 134, at 85.
137 Id.
138 See id. (describing the "adequacy and fairness" of local courts as "uneven at
best").
139 Id.; see also Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A Civil
War Relic Evolves into a Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 458 (1998).
140 See Note, supra note 134, at 85-86.
141 See Beck, supra note 134, at 565-66 ("Prior to the advent of modern law en-
forcement and the development of the regulatory state, England relied heavily upon
qui tam informers to perform many tasks that today are the work of police officers,
prosecutors, and administrative officials."); see also Note, supra note 134, at 86 ("In the
early stages of English criminal law, enforcement of penal statutes was limited by the
lack of an effective public police force.").
142 See Note, supra note 134, at 87-88.
143 See JoHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND Qui TAM ACTIONS § 1-8 (2d ed.
2000, Supp. 2000, & Supp. 2001).
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five would push private citizens to supplement the then-spotty system
of public law enforcement. One commentator described the situation
as follows:
Legislation important to the national sovereign was not always a
high priority to local officials; in fact, enforcement of national law
was particularly difficult when such national legislation undermined
local officials' interests. Faced with limited public enforcement re-
sources and the difficulty of implementing national policies over
numerous, geographically separated, local jurisdictions, Parliament
began during the fourteenth century to turn increasingly to qui tam
enforcement as the most practical means to police compliance with
regulatory requirements. 144
The False Claims Act's qui tam provision is a modern day example of
an informer's action.
Over time, English experience revealed weaknesses in the qui tam
enforcement scheme as various abuses emerged. In each case, Parlia-
ment learned from the experience and fine-tuned the qui tam statutes.
Consider the following example. 145 Some wrongdoers would instigate
collusive qui tam actions to foreclose later punishment. 146 At the time,
qui tamjudgments barred future prosecution for the same offense. To
take advantage of this rule of preclusion, a wrongdoer would find a
sympathetic private litigant to bring a qui tam action. The wrongdoer
and the qui tam informer would then either settle the action-execut-
ing a release from future liability-or the informer would take a nomi-
nal judgment 47 "The judgment or release in the collusive action
would then bar good faith attempts to enforce the statute.' 48
In response to the collusive suits, Parliament made two changes
to the qui tam action. First, if a litigant could prove that a prior qui
tam judgment was collusive, the prior judgment would not bar later
prosecution. 149 Second, any person who colluded with a qui tam in-
144 Beck, supra note 134, at 567. One example of lax local law enforcement re-
lated to national price restrictions on certain goods. Id. at 568. If the local officials
were themselves selling a regulated commodity, Parliament feared that those officials
might shirk their duty to enforce the national price restriction. Id.
145 For a detailed discussion of other qui tam abuses, see id. at 573-608.
146 See id. at 574.
147 See id.; see also Note, supra note 134, at 89 ("A friend of the wrongdoer would
bring suit and either obtain a confessed judgment for a small part of the penalty or
permit the wrongdoer to prevail at a feigned trial.").
148 Beck, supra note 134, at 574.
149 See id.
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former could be punished by two *years in prison.150 Parliament met
qui tam abuse with measures calculated to stop the abuse. 1 1
Ultimately, a number of factors combined to make the English
qui tam actions obsolete. First, the royal courts were opened to all
legal disputes, eliminating the incentive to forum shop. 152 Second,
informers gained a negative reputation and were distrusted based on
often unscrupulous motivations for economic gain.153 Third, and
most important for present purposes, the need for private enforce-
ment suits diminished as the English public police force grew more
effective in dealing with public wrongs.'
54
The English qui tam experience yields two relevant observations.
First, the informer's action variation on the traditional qui tam action
addressed a real need in English law enforcement. English officials
saw a problem with detecting and punishing those who violated public
law. The qui tam action, with its incentive to informers, addressed this
need. Second, Parliament continuously adapted the qui tam action to
changing circumstances. When informers or wrongdoers began to
abuse the action, Parliament fine-tuned the qui tam statutes to prevent
further abuse. Moreover, when the law enforcement need subsided,
so did the qui tam action. 5 5 As we will see below, the American qui
tam experience followed a similar pattern of adapting qui tam to
changing needs over time.15 6
150 See id.
151 See Note, supra note 134, at 89-90 (describing Parliament's efforts to address
qui tam abuses).
152 See id. at 85.
153 See Beck, supra note 134, at 575-85 (describing tactics that indicate informers'
bad reputations).
154 See id. at 601 ("The decline of qui tam enforcement coincided with the develop-
ment of modem police departments and the proliferation of public prosecutors.").
155 See Meador & Warren, supra note 139, at 458 ("[T]he qui tam suit became less
popular as England developed an effective public police force.").
156 Of course, given the experiential nature of qui tam evolution, we should not be
surprised to find scholarly suggestions for further refining, or even replacing, the qui
tam action. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Market-Based Administrative Enforcement, 15
YALE.J. ON REC. 197, 209 (1998) (suggesting replacement of qui tam actions with a
private enforcement scheme that avoids qui tam's incentive for "profiteering"). See
generally Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 543
(2000) (reviewing the public-private relationship in law enforcement).
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2. American Evolution of the Qui Tam Action
The qui tam action entered American jurisprudence during the
colonial period, 157 and was popular with the First Congress, with ten
of the first fourteen federal statutes incorporating the qui tam enforce-
ment scheme.158 As in England, early American governments enacted
the qui tam action to supplement poorly developed public law enforce-
ment.159 Further, as in England, "[a]s the country developed, qui tam
actions became less common."1 60 Thus, from the beginning, Ameri-
can qui tam actions were creatures of necessity.
161
The following sections pick up the American qui tam story during
the Civil War, when Congress enacted the first version of the False
Claims Act. The discussion shows how Congress repeatedly amended
the Act in response to experience, as abuses emerged and law enforce-
ment needs changed. Throughout these changes, however, Con-
gress's purpose has remained the same: to tailor the False Claims Act's
qui tam provision to the unique law enforcement problems posed by
the detection and punishment of fraud against the federal
government.
157 See Note, supra note 134, at 93-97 (describing early American adoption of and
experience with qui tam actions); see also Raoul Berger, Standing To Sue in Public Ac-
tions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE LJ. 816, 825-27 (1969) (describing
informer actions in English law, as evident in the colonies, prior to the Constitution).
158 BOESE, supra note 143, § 1-9 ("At least ten of the first 14 statutes enacted by the
first United States Congress relied on some sort of qui tam action to supplement the
enforcement role of government agents .... [T]hese actions were popular among
legislators for the same reason giving rise to their use in England: lack of an effective
public policing force."); see also Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the
Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1406-09 (1988) (describing qui tam
legislation enacted by first two Congresses); Caminker, supra note 37, at 342 (" Qui tam
actions were routinely authorized by the First and subsequent early Congresses.").
159 See HaroldJ. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons
from History, 38 Am. U. L. REv. 275, 296-303 (1989).
160 Meador & Warren, supra note 139, at 458; see also Francis E. Purcell, Jr., Com-
ment, Qui Tam Suits Under the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986: The Need for Clear
Legislative Expression, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 935, 940 (1993) (describing how statutory
restrictions and judicial monitoring combined to decrease the number of qui tam
suits).
161 See Note, supra note 134, at 99-100 ("So long as qui tam was necessary to en-
force the penal laws, it was utilized.").
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a. The Original Federal False Claims Act
During the Civil War, the federal government experienced ram-
pant fraud at the hands of defense contractors. 162 Army officers had
reported numerous incidents where the federal government had paid
for certain supplies only to receive defective goods or nothing at all.'
63
For example, "[t] he Army had received small arms that inspection re-
vealed to be useless and artillery shells filled with sawdust rather than
explosives."' 64 A House of Representatives Report characterized the
problem as follows: "An unpardonable eagerness to make the misfor-
tunes of the nation the source of personal aggrandizement, as in the
case of other officials who became directly or indirectly connected
with the large and lucrative government contracts elsewhere men-
tioned, is unfortunately too manifest . "... ,65 Congress feared that
many instances of fraud went either undetected or unpunished, cost-
ing the federal government substantial amounts of money.166 The
main law enforcement problem was that information about such
fraud was uniquely in the possession of the wrongdoers. 167 The ur-
gency of the dilemma was further exacerbated by the belief that some
public law enforcement officials participated in and profited from the
frauds.' 68 Because such fraud was difficult to detect and punish, it was
pervasive in scope and "massive" in amount. 69 Unchecked, such
162 See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 952 (1863) (statements of Sen. Howard)
("The country, as we know, has been full of complaints respecting the frauds and
corruptions practiced in obtaining pay from the Government during the present
war."); see also Meador & Warren, supra note 139, at 458.
163 See S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.CAN. 5266, 5273.
164 Beck, supra note 134, at 555; see also CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 952-56
(debating the form of the bill to address various abuses by defense contractors).
165 H.R. REP. No. 37-2, pt. ii-'a, at XXXVIII-IX (1862).
166 See id. at III (explaining that after the House condemned certain practices by
government contractors the practices were "more secretly pursued and more difficult
of detection, and at the same time more flagrant, if possible, and injurious to the
public interests").
167 Id.
168 See Caminker, supra note 37, at 351 ("In 1863, many public officials were
thought to be intimately involved in the corrupt practices of Civil War defense con-
tractors, and Congress feared that public law enforcement officers might therefore
hesitate to prosecute offenses diligently."); see also Comment, Qui Tam Suits Under the
Federal False Claims Act: Tool of the Private Litigant in Public Actions, 67 Nw. U. L. REv.
446, 453-54 n.32 (1972).
169 United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309 (1976); see also 1 FRED A. SHAN-
NON, THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNION ARMY 1861-1865, at 58
(Peter Smith ed., 1965) (1928) (describing the "astounding amount of illegal and
fraudulent activities" in defense contracting during the Civil War).
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fraud would set back the North's war effort at a critical time.
170
Under these circumstances, Congress turned to the qui tam action to
once again supplement federal law enforcement.
In 1863, the Thirty-Seventh Congress passed the first incarnation
of the False Claims Act (1863 Act).' 7 ' The 1863 Act targeted the pri-
vate contractors who were defrauding the Union government, 172 as
well as state officials who did so in procuring supplies for state
troops.' 7 3 To catch the wrongdoers, the 1863 Act relied on a partner-
ship between United States Attorneys' 74 and private citizens, known as
qui tam relators, to hail the fraudfeasors into court.' 75 The 1863 Act
allowed suits by any person with knowledge of fraud against the gov-
ernment and encouraged relators to bring suit by giving them a share
ofany money recovered in the suit. 1 76 Indeed, the potential recovery
was so great that even those engaging in fraud were expected to bring
qui tam actions.' 77 Congress based the qui tam provision "upon the
170 See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 953 (1863) (statements of Sen. Howard)
("[I] t is entirely clear that without the employment of contractors for the purpose of
procuring [arms and other supplies], the Army itself would be totally worthless and
useless.").
171 See United States ex reL Stevens v. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res., 162 F.3d 195, 205
(2d Cir. 1998). The original 1863 Act was called "[a]n Act to prevent and punish
Frauds upon the Government of the United States." Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12
Stat. 696, 696-98 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994) and 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729-3733 (1994)).
172 SeeJames B. Helmer, Jr. & Robert Clark NeffJr., War Stories: A History of the Qui
Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, and
Their Application in the United States ex rel. Gravitt v. General Electric Co. Litigation,
18 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 35, 35-36 (1991); see also Sharon A.Jenks & Brian Kaplan, False
Claims, 34 AM. CPiM. L. REV. 555, 555 (1997) ;John Terrence A. Rosenthal & Robert T.
Alter, Clear and Convincing to Whom? The False Claims Act and Its Burden of Proof Stan-
dard: Why the Government Needs a Big Stick, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1409, 1419 (2000)
("The incredible surge in war spending during this period, coupled with a lack of
sufficient federal law enforcement organizations, created the impetus for Congress to
legislate the Act in an effort to curb [defense contractor fraud].") (citations omitted).
173 See H.R. REP. No. 37-2, pt. ii-a, at I-Il (1863) (discussing abuses by state
officials).
174 The 1863 Act predated the creation of the Department of Justice.
175 See Lisa Estrada, Case Note, An Assessment of Qui Tam Suits by Corporate Counsel
Under the False Claims Act: United States ex rel. Doe v. X Corp., 7 GEO. MASON L. REV.
163, 165 (1998).
176 See Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 1.
177 See Beck, supra note 134, at 556 ("The provision for qui tam enforcement was
designed to encourage participants in fraudulent schemes to bring the wrongdoing to
light."); see also James T. Blanch, Note, The Constitutionality of the False Claims Act's Qui
Tam Provision, 16 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 701, 703-04 (1993). The Act provided for a
$2000 penalty for each false claim plus double damages. See Meador & Warren, supra
note 139, at 459. The private relator who initiated a qui tam action also stood to
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old-fashioned idea of holding out a temptation, and 'setting a rogue
to catch a rogue' which is the safest and most expeditious way... of
bringing rogues to justice."
178
Early on, a federal district judge described the theory behind this
qui tam provision in United States v. Griszwold."79 That case emphasized
the importance of the qui tam plaintiff, reasoning that the federal gov-
ernment could not release a defendant from paying damages owed to
an informer even though damages owed to the government could be
released. °80 The court stated:
The statute is a remedial one. It is intended to protect the treasury
against the hungry and unscrupulous host that encompasses it on
every side, and should be construed accordingly. It was passed
upon the theory, based on experience as old as modem civilization, that
one of the least expensive and most effective means ofpreventing frauds on
the treasuy is to make the perpetrators of them liable to actions by private
persons acting, if you please, under the strong stimulus of personal ill will or
the hope of gain. Prosecutions conducted by such means compare
with the ordinary methods as the enterprising privateer does to the
slow-going public vessel. 18 '
Early federal precedent recognized that the practical problems associ-
ated with detecting and punishing fraud on the government required
private involvement in the enforcement process. The 1863 Act's qui
tam provisions responded to that acknowledged necessity.
b. The 1943 Amendments to the Federal False Claims Act
After the Civil War, the 1863 Act fell into disuse for several de-
cades until a new law enforcement need arose. 82 In the 1930s, the
New Deal and United States military intervention created new oppor-
collect fifty percent of the total recovery and forfeitures. See id. The buying power of
$2,000 in 1863 would have been close to $18,000 in 1986. H.R. REP. No. 99-660, at 17
(1986). The figure was based on the Consumer Price Index as reported by the Con-
gressional Research Service. Id.
178 See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 956 (1863) (statements of Sen.
Howard).
179 24 F. 361 (D. Or. 1885), afd, 30 F. 762 (C.C.D. Or. 1887).
180 See BOESE, supra note 143, § 1-12 (Supp. 2000).
181 Griswold, 24 F. at 366 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has quoted this
same passage in an opinion broadly construing the qui tam provision of the False
Claims Act. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.5 (1943); see
also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 (1997)
(quoting the same passage from Griswold).
182 See Christopher C. Frieden, Comment, Protecting the Government's Interests: Qui
Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act and the Government's Right To Veto Settlements of
Those Actions, 47 EMORY L.J. 1041, 1045 (1998).
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tunities for government contractors to profit from fraud against the
federal government.18 3 This new round of qui tam actions exposed a
flaw in the 1863 Act: relators could bring suit based on public infor-
mation obtained from criminal fraud indictments. 84 Courts allowed
these suits because the 1863 Act did not require a qui tam action to be
based on a relator's independent, first-hand knowledge of fraud.185
These "parasitic" lawsuits
created the predictable and undesirable outcome that whenever a
criminal indictment was issued, there was a frenzied rush to file civil
suits and claim qui tam awards. Because these suits were based on infor-
mation the government already had, they did nothing to further the qui tam
provision's purpose of bringing to light fraud that the DOJ could not discover
on its own. Parasitic suits served only to decrease what the government
could recover from FCA defendants and to enrich qui tam relators who did
nothing more than learn through the news media of a criminal
indictment.
18 6
Parasitic suits showed that the 1863 Act's qui tam provision did not
tailor federal law enforcement efforts as well as it could. While non-
parasitic suits uncovered and prosecuted fraud the government would
not have otherwise discovered, parasitic suits served no law enforce-
ment need, instead simply giving away government money to private
actors who provided no useful service.'
8 7
183 See, e.g., BOESE, supra note 143, § 1-10 to 1-12; Richared A. Bales, A Constitu-
tional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 381, 389 ("Beginning in the 1930s, how-
ever, the New Deal and World War II greatly expanded the role of the federal
government in the national economy, and commensurately expanded the opportuni-
ties for unscrupulous contractors to defraud the government."); Gary W. Thompson,
A Critical Analysis of Restrictive Interpretations Under the False Claims Act's Public Disclosure
Bar: Reopening the Qui Tam Door, 27 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 669, 673-74 (1998) (Qui tam
actions "increased... with the rise in federal spending during the New Deal and in
preparation for World War II.").
184 See Frieden, supra note 182, at 1045.
185 See id.
186 Blanch, supra note 177, at 704 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Attorney
General Francis Biddle registered a similar complaint with Congress: Such qui tam
actions were "mere parasitical actions, occasionally brought only after law-enforce-
ment officers [had] investigated and prosecuted persons guilty of a violation of law
and solely because of the hope of a large reward." Letter from Francis Biddle to Hon.
Frederick Van Nuys, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate
(Aug. 28, 1942), in S. REP. No. 77-1708, at 2 (1942).
187 The United States experienced a similar problem during the War of 1812 with
privateers, "that is, civilian ships licensed by the government to prey on enemy
merchant shipping." ROBERT LECKIE, FROM SEA TO SHINING SEA 232 (1993). While
such deputized sailing vessels "would seem.., a great asset of the United States Navy,"
they were actually a hindrance because of the great financial incentive in capturing
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In 1943, Congress amended the 1863 Act to address parasitic
suits. The 1943 Amendment denied federal courts jurisdiction over a
qui tam action "based on evidence or information the Government
had when the action was brought."'x8 8 By closing this loophole, Con-
gress better tailored the qui tam action to the law enforcement need
that was its raison d'etre.189
c. The 1986 Amendments and the Current Federal False
Claims Act
Unfortunately, the 1943 Amendment had an unintended effect
that undercut Congress's enforcement scheme. The amendment
barred all qui tam actions based on public information, even when the
relator was the original source of the information.190 For example, in United
States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean,191 the Seventh Circuit relied on the 1943
Amendment to dismiss a qui tam action brought by the State of Wis-
consin.192 Wisconsin's qui tam suit alleged Medicaid fraud that the
State itself had discovered and disclosed to the federal government. 193
When Wisconsin later brought a qui tam action based on those same
allegations, the 1943 Amendment barred the suit, even though the
State was the original source of the information.' 94 While Wisconsin
had detected fraud the federal government would not have uncov-
ered, the State could not benefit from the qui tam action because it
had disclosed the fraud to the federal government before filing the qui
tam action. 95 Thus, the 1943 Amendment undercut the Act's overall
foreign merchant ships and their cargo. Id. Given the lucrative nature of privateer-
ing, the United States Navy had difficulty recruiting sailors away from such service.
See id. Also, given the competitive nature of privateering, privateers were reluctant to
share information they believed gave them an advantage. See id. at 232-33. One com-
mentator summarized the point this way: "IT] he U.S. Navy was at war with the Royal
Navy, the privateers were at war for money." Id. at 233. As with the early False Claims
Act, poor tailoring of an incentive scheme lead to undesirable unanticipated
consequences.
188 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (4) (1982) (superseded 1986).
189 At one point, opposing forces in Congress wanted to either repeal the Act
altogether or leave it unamended. See Beck, supra note 134, at 558-60. The final
legislation was a "compromise" that targeted the abusive, parasitic qui tam suits. See id.
at 560-61.
190 See Blanch, supra note 177, at 704-05.
191 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984).
192 See id. at 1106-07.
193 Id. at 1103-04.
194 See id. at 1106-07.
195 See id. at 1106.
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purpose of rewarding relators who helped detect fraud that the
United States would not have otherwise discovered.
196
In 1986, Congress again amended the 1863 Act to refine the in-
centives offered to private citizens. 197 This time, Congress provided
that qui tam relators could bring suit if they were the "'original source'
of information that later became public."'198 In addition, Congress re-
fined other aspects of the qui tam action, better tailoring the statute to
the federal government's law enforcement needs.' 99 For example, the
1986 Amendments added provisions to protect whistle-blowers, 200 in-
creased damages from double to triple, and allowed attorney's fees
201
196 See Frieden, supra note 182, at 1046-47.
197 See H.R. REP. No. 99-660, at 23 (1986); Caminker, supra note 37, at 343-44 &
344 n.13.
198 Blanch, supra note 177, at 705 (citing United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lock-
heed Missiles & Space Co., 722 F. Supp. 607, 609 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1989), quoting 31
U.S.C. § 3730(e) (4) (A) (1994)).
199 One commentator has described three motivating factors behind the 1986
Amendments:
First, Congress recognized that one reason "most fraud goes undetected" is
because of the Government's "weak internal controls and the fact that gov-
ernment auditors do not pay adequate attention to possible fraud."
Second .... Congress expressed concern that "there are instances in which
the Government knew of the information that was the basis of the qui tam
suit, but in which the Government took no action."
Third.... Congress recognized that the Government, working alone, simply
has insufficient resources to detect and prosecute the level of fraud being
committed, especially given the growth and diversification of federally
funded programs ....
Thompson, supra note 183, at 677-78 (citations omitted); see also Beck, supra note
134, at 562-63 (citing similar reasons behind the 1986 Amendments).
200 One commentator describes how the whistie-blower protection helped better
tailor the False Claims Act to detect fraud against the federal government:
Prior to the 1986 amendments, the protection of the employment status of a
person involved in a false claims case depended upon the widely varying law
of the state where the person resided. The new amendments provide a fed-
eral standard that will strongly deter employers from taking any action
against a qui tam plaintiff that could be considered to have a negative effect
on his or her employment status.
John Phillips & Janet Goldstein, The False Claims Act in Practice, in Qui TAM: BEYOND
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTs 469, 480 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course, Handbook
Series No. H-456, 1993); see also S.. REP. No. 99-345, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269 ("Detecting.fraud is usually very difficult without the cooper-
ation of individuals who are either close observers or otherwise involved in the fraudu-
lent activity."); Beck, supra note 134, at 563 ("Government investigators in some cases
can uncover fraud by their own efforts, but in other circumstances, they need inside
information to detect and punish fraudulent schemes.").
201 See Phillips & Goldstein, supra note 200, at 479-80.
[VCOL- 77:1
APPLYING COASE TO QUI TAM ACTIONS
and an increased monetary incentive (from ten to fifteen percent of
the recovery) for a successful relator.202 In sum, the 1986 Amend-
ments show Congress once again adjusting the qui tam action based
on experience.20 3
3. The Qui Tam Action of the Federal False Claims Act
The preceding Section described how the False Claims Act got
where it is today. The evolution showed Congress adapting the Act to
meet changing law enforcement needs. This Section. completes the
picture by briefly describing the main substantive and procedural fea-
tures of the current False Claims Act's qui tam action. The discussion
shows how the qui tam action is designed to combat the problems
posed by detecting and punishing fraud against the federal
government.
A False Claims Act violation has three elements; a person must
(1) knowingly;204 (2) present a claim for payment or approval to the
United States;205 and (3) the claim must be false or fraudulent.20 6 In
substance, the False Claims Act targets a specific class of conduct-
false claims made against the United States. Procedurally, the Act is
tailored to the specific law enforcement needs posed by that conduct.
The first procedural step in a False Claims Act qui tam action is
for the private plaintiff, known as the relator, to serve the complaint
and turn over "substantially all material evidence and information the
In addition to whatever percentage of the recovery the attorney. negotiates
with his client, the new amendments also provide for attorneys' fees paid by
the defendant based upon hours reasonably spent. This is especially impor-
tant in smaller cases such as Medicare fraud where a percentage of the plain-
tiff's potential recovery may be insufficient to encourage attorneys to file
meritorious cases.
Id.
202 Id. at 479 ("The old law allowed the qui tam plaintiff to recover 'up to 10%' of
the amount received by the government. Thus, even in a successful case, the plaintiff
could receive nothing. The new law guarantees a minimum of 15% recovery.").
203 For a more detailed discussion of important 1986 Amendments that facilitate
qui tam actions, see Frieden, supra note 182, at 1047-58.
204 A person acts "knowingly" if she "has actual knowledge of the information; acts
in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or acts in reckless
disregard of the truth or falsity of the information, and no proof of specific intent to
defraud is required." 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (b) (1) (1994); see also Meador & Warren, supra
note 139, at 462.
205 A claim is "any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for-
money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the
United States Government provides any portion of the money or property which is
requested or demanded." 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c).
206 Id. § 3729(a).
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person possesses" to the United States government; 20 7 the action is
then filed in federal district court in camera and under seal for at least
sixty days. 208 During that sixty-day period,20 9 the United States must
decide whether to intervene in the action.210 To make an informed
decision, the government must have time to investigate the relator's
claims, and the sixty-day in camera period keeps the relator's allega-
tions out of the public domain while the government does so. 2 11 The
1986 Amendments, while allowing private initiation of lawsuits, also
allow the executive an opportunity to share responsibility for prosecu-
tion of such claims. 212
Dependii on whether the United States intervenes, the case will
follow one of two tracks. If the United States intervenes, the relator
will remain a party to the suit, but the United States will become re-
sponsible for prosecuting the suit "and shall not be bound by an act of
the person bringing the action."213 Conversely, if the United States
does not intervene, the qui tam relator may bring a civil action in the
name of the United States.214 How much the qui tam relator may re-
cover, how the litigation is conducted, and how it may be resolved all
depend to some degree on which track the case takes.
First, the amount of the relator's recovery varies depending on
whether the United States intervenes in the case. On the one hand, if
the United States intervenes, the relator is limited to between fifteen
percent and twenty-five percent of the United States's recovery.
215
The precise percentage "depend [s] upon the extent to which the per-
son substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action. '216 On
207 Id. § 3730 (b) (2). The materials are served on the United States Attorney Gen-
eral and the United States Attorney for the federal district where the suit is filed. Id.
208 Id.
209 Upon "good cause shown," the United States may apply for an extension of the
sixty-day period. See id. § 3730(b) (3).
210 See id. § 3730(b)(2).
211 See Gabriel L. Imperato, International Investigations, Government Investigations,
Whistlellower Concerns: Techniques To Protect Your Health Care Organization, 51 ALA. L.
REV. 205, 232 (1999) ("The lawsuit remains sealed for 60 days (and usually much
longer) to allow the government time to investigate the claims and determine if it
wishes to join as a plaintiff in the case."); see also Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp.,
117 F.3d 154, 155 (5th Cir. 1997); Wercinski v. IBM Corp., 982 F. Supp. 449,452 (S.D.
Tex. 1997).
212 See Caminker, supra note 37, at 350-51.
213 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (1).
214 See id. § 3730(b) (1) ("The action shall be brought in the name of the Govern-
ment."); see also id. § 3730(b) (4) (B) ("[T]he person bringing the action shall have the
right to conduct the action [if the Government does not intervene].").
215 See id. § 3730(d) (1).
216 Id.
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the other hand, if the United States does not intervene, the relator
will recover between twenty-five and thirty percent of the action's pro-
ceeds, including treble damages plus penalties per each false claim
submitted.217 The precise percentage depends on what "amount...
the court decides is reasonable for collecting the civil penalty and
damages. '218 In either case, the remainder of the recovery from the
action returns to the federal treasury.
219
Second, who controls the litigation depends on whether the
United States intervenes. As noted above, if the United States inter-
venes, it will control the course of litigation.220 This means that the
United States makes final decisions regarding discovery, the filing of
motions, and the conduct of the trial. The relator, however, "shall
have the right to continue as a party," subject to restrictions.221 The
United States may ask the court to restrict the relator's participation
"[u]pon ... showing ... that unrestricted participation during the
course of the litigation by the person initiating the action would inter-
fere with or unduly delay the government's prosecution of the case, or
would be repetitious, irrelevant, or for purposes of harassment."2
22
Further, the defendant may ask the court to restrict the relator's par-
ticipation if such participation "would be for purposes of harassment
or would cause the defendant undue burden or unnecessary ex-
pense. '223 Possible restrictions include "(i) limiting the number of
witnesses the person may call; (ii) limiting the length of testimony of
such witnesses; (iii) limiting the person's cross examination of wit-
nesses; or (iv) otherwise limiting the participation by the person in
the litigation."224 Consequently, a benevolent and cooperative relator
could participate fully in all phases of the action, even to the extent of
calling witnesses at trial. Ultimately, though, the United States may
dismiss the suit witfiout the relator's consent.2 25
If the United States does not intervene, the qui tam relator dic-
tates the course of litigation. The relator "uses her own resources; she
writes the briefs, argues the motions, and, most importantly, controls
217 See id. §§ 3729(a) (treble damages and penalty), 3730(d) (2) (percentage of
proceeds).
218 Id. § 3730(d)(2).
219 Id. §§ 3730(d) (1) (if the government does intervene), 3730(d) (2) (if the gov--
ernment does not intervene).
220 See supra text accompanying note 213.
221 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (1).
222 Id. § 3730(c) (2) (C).
223 Id. § 3730(c) (2) (D).
224 Id. § 3730(c) (2) (C).
225 See id. § 3730(c) (2) (A). The United States must give the relator notice and an
opportunity to be heard on the United States's motion to dismiss. See id.
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the litigation stxfategy." 226 Also, the relator drafts all pleadings, con-
ducts discovery, and conducts the trial. The United States's participa-
tion is minimal: it may file briefs with the trial court and retains the
right to "be served with copies of all pleadings filed in the action
and... with copies of all deposition transcripts. '" 22 7 Also, the United
States may seek a stay of the relator's discovery if the discovery "would
interfere with the Government's investigation or prosecution of a
criminal or civil matter arising out of the same facts." 228 Otherwise,
"at least for procedural purposes, [the United States] is as a nominal
party plaintiff. '229 ,
Even if the United States declines intervention at the outset, it
may intervene later "upon a showing of good cause." 230 But even
here, intervention will not limit or constrict in any way "the status and
rights of the person initiating the action."231 The role of the United
States in the qui tam action, however, seems to be that of an overseer.
The United States may dismiss the qui tam action over any objections
by the relator232 and never forfeits its right to stay informed of all
proceedings. 233
Third, who may settle the litigation depends on whether the
United States intervenes. If the United States intervenes, it may settle
the litigation without the relator's consent if the district court finds
"that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under
all the circumstances. 23 4 Conversely, if the United States does not
intervene, there is debate as to the relator's right to settle the litiga-
tion with the court's approval. The circuits are currently split over
whether the United States has an absolute veto over the relator's right
to settle.
235
226 Valerie R. Park, Note, The False Claims Act, Qui Tam Relators, and the Govern-
ment: Which Is the Real Party to the Action ?, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1070 (1991).
227 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (3).
228 Id. § 3730(c) (4).
229 Park, supra note 226, at 1071.
230 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c) (3) ("When a person proceeds with the action, the court,
without limiting the status and rights of the person initiating the action, may never-
theless permit the Government to intervene at a later date upon a showing of good
cause.").
231 Id.
232 See id. § 3730(c)(2)(A).
233 See id. § 3730(c)(3).
234 Id. § 3730(c) (2) (B).
235 Compare United States ex rel Doyle v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335,
339-40 (6th Cir. 2000) (United States has absolute veto power over relator's settle-
ment), andSearcyv. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 158-60 (5th Cir. 1997)
(same), with United States ex rel. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715, 723
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The numbers indicate that the False Claims Act has been effective
at detecting fraud against the United States, leading to more than $4
billion in recoveries. 23 6 In fiscal year 2000, relators filed 366 qui tam
actions and recouped over $1.2 billion for the United States.23 7 Since
the 1986 Amendments, through fiscal year 1999, the average recovery
in a successful qui tam action is $5.8 million, and the average relator's
award is $1.0 million.238 Based on this data, as well as assumptions
about the incidence of fraud, a 1996 study also calculated the deter-
rent effect of qui tam actions:
Deterrence of fraud due to the 1986 Amendments for their first ten
years of existence (1986-1996) is estimated as between $147.9 bil-
lion and $295.8 billion, and for their second ten years of existence
(1996-2006) is estimated as between $240.2 billion (23% of the
fraud projected to be committed over that. period) and $480.3 bil-
lion (46% of the fraud projected to be committed over that period),
even assuming a conservative estimate of deterrent effect.
Deterrence of fraud due to the qui tam provisions of the amended
Act for their first ten years of existence (1986-1996) is estimated as
between $35.6 billion and $71.3 billion, and for their second ten
years of existence (1996-2006) is estimated as between $105.1 bil-
lion and $210.1 billion, even assuming a conservative estimate of
deterrent effect.
239
Thus, in addition to detecting and punishing fraud against the gov-
ernment, qui tam actions arguably deter further fraud, compounding
the law enforcement benefits of the tool.
Considering that states and state agencies are large recipients of
federal funds, they often find themselves as defendants in False Claims
Act qui tam actions: "[F] ederal grants to state and local governments
more than doubled from $108 billion in 1987 to $228 billion in
(9th Cir. 1994) (limiting the United States's power to veto a settlement). The contro-
versy surrounds the following provision of the False Claims Act: "The action may be
dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give written consent to the dis-
missal and their reasons for consenting." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (1). The question is
whether this provision applies to a stipulated dismissal in conjunction with a settle-
ment. If so, the Attorney General may effectively veto any settlement by the relator.
236 See Taxpayers Against Fraud, Qui Tam Statistics (As Reported by DOJ FYEnding
September 30, 2000), at http://www.taf.org/statistics.htnl (last visited Aug. 28, 2001).
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 WILLIAM L. STRINGER, THt 1986 FALSE CIiMs Aar AMENDMENTS: AN ASSESS-
MENT OF ECONOMIC IMPACr, Executive Summary (1996), reprinted in FALSE CLAIMS ACT
AND Qui TAM Q. REV. (Taxpayers Against Fraud, Washington D.C.), Oct. 1996, at 30,
available at http://www.taf.org/publications/PDF/oct96qr.pdf (last visited Aug. 28,
2001).
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1996."240 This drastic increase in funding brings with it increased op-
portunities for fraud. Consequently, states have been called as de-
fendants under the False Claims Act, for example, for allegedly
falsifying information on grant applications, 241 and submitting false
claims when receiving federal incentive funding and reimburse-
ments.242 States are part of the law enforcement problem targeted by
the False Claims Act.
B. The Federal False Claims Act as Ancillary Delegation
It is now time to ask whether the False Claims Act's qui tam action
is a naked or an ancillary delegation. Before turning to the analysis,
we once again state the applicable test:
(1) Is the challenged delegation part of a larger effort to address
specific law enforcement problems posed by the given regulatory
context? Heavy federal law enforcement work load is not a specific
law enforcement problem. The party seeking to overcome state im-
munity bears the burden with respect to this question,
(2) Is the challenged delegation of federal law enforcement power
necessary to solve the specific law enforcement problem? The court
should answer this question based on the information before Con-
gress at the time it acted. After considering possible alternatives,
the court should defer to a plausible argument for necessity.
2 43
In tracing the history of the False Claims Act, the preceding Section
set forth the details relevant to this test. Thus, rather than rehash that
material, this Section briefly summarizes the case for treating the Act's
qui tam action as an ancillary delegation. We now consider each ques-
tion in turn.
First, the qui tam action itself is a product of necessity. England
and later the American colonies turned to the qui tam action to sup-
plement weak public law enforcement. 244 As public law enforcement
evolved, the qui tam action played a more limited role, supplementing
240 United States ex reL Zissler v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 154 F.3d 870, 874
(8th Cir. 1998) (citing BUREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. FES/
96, FEDERAL EXPENDITURES BY STATE FOR FiscAL YEAR 1996, at 46, tbl.11 (1997)).
241 See Wilkins ex reL United States v. Ohio, 885 F. Supp. 1055, 1062 (S.D. Ohio
1995) ("Allegedly, defendants falsely certified that the grant monies would be used
for certain specified purposes and that the State of Ohio would provide proper moni-
toring of the use of funds by community action agencies.").
242 See United States ex rel Graber v. City of New York, 8 F. Supp. 2d 343, 346
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("State [d]efendants ... sued for accepting federal foster care fund-
ing to which they supposedly knew or should have known they were not entitled.").
243 See supra text accompanying note 121.
244 See supra notes 141-44, 157-214 and accompanying text.
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public law enforcement in specific areas. The False Claims Act is just
such a case, with Congress enacting and maintaining the Act's qui tam
action to address the unique law enforcement needs posed by fraud
on the government.2 45 During the Civil War and World War II, fraud
by military contractors proved hard to detect and punish, harming the
United States's war efforts. Today, private actors and state govern-
ments routinely deal with some arm of the federal government, and
those dealings provide opportunities for fraud and self-dealing. Our
massive, unwieldy federal bureaucracy has become difficult to police,
leaving the federal government vulnerable to wrongdoers. From the'
Civil War to the modern administrative state, the False Claims Act's
qui tam action has targeted this pressing law enforcement need.
Second, experience has shown that the False Claims Act is neces-
sary to effective detection and punishment of fraud against the gov-
ernment. Since its inception, the Act has been a work in progress,
with Congress periodically tailoring the qui tam provision to better
achieve federal law enforcement needs. The 1863 Act was Congress's
response to reports of.rampant fraud on the Union's Civil War effort.
Contractors promised quality arms and supplies, but often delivered
shoddy or non-existent goods. The local military commanders had
their hands full fighting a war and could not police such misconduct.
Thus, using the qui,tam action, Congress deputized ordinary citizens
to detect and punish the fraud.
Passed during wartime, the 1863 Act was a hasty response drafted
with little precision. Consequently, the 1863 Act was subject to abuse,
as with the parasitic lawsuits brought during the first half of the twenti-
eth century. The 1943 Amendments tweaked the 1863 Act, trying to
stop parasitic suits by barring qui tam suits based on information al-
ready in the federal government's possession. But, the 1943 Amend-
ments proved too strong medicine, barring not only parasitic suits but
also legitimate qui tam suits where the relator was the source of the
government's information. So, in 1986, Congress again refined the
False Claims Act by allowing qui tam suits where the relator was the"
source of the government's preexisting information. 246 The 1986
Amendments also addressed new law enforcement challenges posed
by ever-increasing public-private interaction within federally funded
programs. Congress observed that often times the only witnesses to
the fraud would be the wrongdoers themselves. To police these ex-
245 See supra notes 157-203 and accompanying text.
246 See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text.
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panding, hidden opportunities for fraud, the 1986 Amendments in-
creased incentives for qui tam relators.
247
From 1863 through 1986, the story of the False Claims Act is a
story of Congress's ongoing struggle with fraud against the govern-
ment. Over time, the law enforcement problem has changed and
abuses have arisen. Throughout that time, however, the qui tam ac-
tion has been a central character in the narrative. And, with Con-
gress's aid, qui tam has proved a compelling protagonist, growing and
changing with each twist and turn in the plot.
CONCLUSION
History supports a credible story of the False Claims Act's qui tam
provision as an ancillary delegation. Whether this story is the most
persuasive account of the Act is not our main point. That is a descrip-
tive question beyond the scope of the present effort. Rather, we de-
fend two points, one doctrinal and the other weakly descriptive.
Doctrinally, state immunity should not bar all delegation of the
United States's power to sue the states. Rather, when Congress dele-
gates federal law enforcement power as part of a larger, good faith
effort to better structure federal law enforcement efforts, such a dele-
gation ought to overcome state immunity. The ancillary delegation
doctrine provides a judicially administrable test that implements this
idea.
Descriptively, we offer an account of the False Claims Act's qui
tam action that satisfies the ancillary delegation doctrine. We do not
claim that our account is the account; that was not our goal. Rather,
we sought to re-frame the analysis. We did so by exposing the fear
underlying the Supreme Court's dicta in Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak,248 that delegations of the United States's law enforcement
power will circumvent state immunity. Ancillary delegations do not
raise that fear, and the False Claims Act is a credible candidate for
such treatment.
247 See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
248 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
